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FORE?:ORD
This thesis is an intensive study of a wide field
rather than an intensive stud:' of s restricted one. In-
as much as the writer is expectin?? to teach psycholocry
next year it was the opinion of his advisers, Dr.
Strickland and Dean Wysse, that a thesis of this sort
would be acceptable to the faculty and helpful to the
writer. The ^reat problem has been that of choosinp; the
contents. An effort has been made to prevent choppiness
without too nireat volume. For this reason the many points
in the outline will not appear in the body of the oaper
which will be divided into chapters only. Where it seems
advisable certain divisions will be made. A bibliography is
included with each chapter, since each chapter is more or less
of a unit by itself. Only the section of each book bearinfr
directly on the subject of the chapter is recorded, hence
the same book may appear in the bibliography of more than
one chapter.
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CHAPTFR I.
INTRODUCTORY.
Psycholoc^y has usually been approached from one of two
viewpoints: the metaDhysical or the scientific, the former
bein£? rational in nature and the latter empirical; the
former dealt with the nature, destiny, and orie;in of the soul,
the latter with the facts of mental life as they appear
in experience.
Historical psychology has been of the metaphysical
and rationalstic type. In turn this school of thoup^ht may
be divided alone; the lines of differing^ opinions as regards
the nature of ultimate reality. As to the nature of the soul
some were spiritualists, others were materialists; as to the
relationship between mind and body some were dualists, and
others v/ere monists . Readily it can be seen that psychology
of this sort must needs have been closely related to phil-
osophy; indeed, until strictly modern times it was dominated
by the latter and considered a branch of the same. It is
not surprisinf? that as man studied the nature of the mind,
its relationship to the body, the relations of himself with
his fellows, and analyzed his own diverse reactions, that he
should seek a more satisfyin?? answer to his questions than
philosophy could afford.
This desire to analyze the mind led to the development
of what is called the faculty psycholoe;y--a transitional school
serving as a link betTfeen the old philosophy-dominated psy-
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chology and modern psychology. The "mental faculty" idea con-
trolled psychology from about 1680 until 1754. The name of
?/olff is inseparably connected with it. Py him and his dis-
ciples the mind was divided into compartments. Sensation,
imagination, will, etc. each had a special faculty. The
number of such faculties tended to decrease until only two or
three were recognized: for instance passive and active, or
intellect, sensibility, and will. This type of thought,
even though it was bolstered by such thinkers as the one
mentioned, did not prevail for the reason that it was too
artificial; furthermore it was speedily learned that mere
classification was far from being explanation, and in addition,
the confusing of metaphysics with empirical considerations
was not welcome. Succeedin*^ thinkers came to feel that the
mind must be something more than a mechanical mosaic of
static elements or units.
The idea stressed about the middle of the eighteenth
century was that of associationalism. David Hume and David
Hartely offered association as the essential principle of
mental life. It was their doctrine that (1) an idea is
f
independent, permanent, and revlvable, and is (2) endowed
with the power of association. This doctrine was soon regarded
as more metaph7/-s ical than empirically scientific, and further
reflection made it clear that the vhole process was in reverse.
An idea is now considered as an event in time; also we Imow
that ideas come into consciousness as a result of the process
of association--new ideas that did not formerly exist as far
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as the knowledge of the individual is concerned. This prin-
ciple which seemed to promise so much has been found sadly
inadequate as an explanation of all the complex phenomena of
mental life. Yet v/e are grateful to Hume for the attempt to
analyze self-consciousness and reduce it to the contents of
consciousness. In doine: this he of course built upon the
contribution of Descartes who mic;ht with his, "Coiyito er^o
sum.", be called the discoverer of consciousness.
When we speak of modern psychology we mention a subject
that has but a short history of fifty years. It vvas 1880
before the divorce from philosophy was finally consummated,
and we have the true beginning; of scientific psychology,
its beginning; accounted for b^'^ the stimulus of other natural
sciences that were so rapidly increasing in popularity as
a method of solving man's problems. The name of Professor
Wundt must ever be associated with the new beginning. In
his "Beitrfige zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnemungen" of 1862
he showed how the different theories of sense perception
and psychophysical relations pointed to a new development of
psychology. In the followinc? vears he worked with the tools
of physiology rather than with those of metaphysics, and his
main contribution was his theory of sense perceptions as
generated by sensations. Mlinsterberg and Titchener carried
on his 7/ork; thus began the method known as Structuralism.
It is worthy of remembrance because it marked the beginning
of freedom from metaphysics. At this Doint a quotation from
Klemm is of real significance: "Fxperimental psychology which
owes its birth almost entirely to the '^rerman scientific spirit
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and investic;ation, soon passed beyond the boundaries of its
native country. It has received its most important develop-
(1)
ment outside of Germany in America." Hence the history of
modern psycholo<^y is larp;ely the stor:<' of its prop;ress in
America,
The structuralists were speedily followed by the func-
tionalists of whom Anp-ell, James, Judd, and Dewey are out-
standing representatives. Functionalism of a more radical
type is represented by Pillsbury, while yet another emphasis
under the same 2;eneral head is made by McDougall, who declared
in a preface to a recent work, "Mechanical psycholos^y is
decidedly preponderant at the present time; and my book there-
for is largely a polemic against all psycholoejy of this type
(2)
and on behalf of purposive psycholoo;y ."
More recent still is the em.phasis upon the self as the
unifying factor of experience. This line of thoue;ht is
represented by Miss Calkins, Royce, and James "/ard of Enf^land.
Psychoanalysis and Pehaviorism are receivincr much atten-
tion at present; their contribution will be considered in
its bearins; upon the ma.^or problems to be discussed in
this paper.
(1) Otto Klemm A History of Psycholoe^y p 129.
(2) 7/m. McDougall Outline of Psychology p vlii.
( Preface
)
t
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CHAPTER II.
THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOrTY.
The terms ' osycholoj^y ' and 'psychological' are to-day
used very loosely. A person's definition of psychology
depends very larp;ely upon his point of view. VYoodworth would
say that psychology is the science of mental life, life being
(1)
conceived as consisting in process or action. Miss Calkins
would define the term as the "science of the self in relation
(2)
to environment." Pentley gives us a definition that is
short, to the point, and usable; he defines psychology as the
science that seeks to describe and understand the experience
(3)
and activities of the Dsychosomat ic (m<snd-';-body ) organism.
Throughout the discussion this will be the meaning attached
to the word psychology.
To define what is meant by the word science is not so
eas:;- a task. It's pronouncement affects many persons in the
way that "Open Sesame" affects the youthful reader during his
first journey through the Arabian Nights. It is a word to
conjure with, a god to be worshipped; the adjectival form of the
word is the criterion by which all things are judged in some
quarters. In a most dogmatic and unscientific manner we are
sometimes told just what is and what is not science. The
declaration that science deals only with facts is often made
to indicate that that settles the m.atter. Facts are facts,
likewise life is life; but such statements tell us nothing.
(1) Robert S. \^oodworth Psychology p 17.
(2) Mary '.'Tiiton Calkins A First Po^pk in Psy. p 1.
(3) Madison Pentley The Field of Psy. p 11.
f
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If we ask, "iThat is a fact?" we realize we are face to face
with a real problem. There is a disparity between the facts
discovered by physical science and those furnished by the
direct testimony of consciousness. For instance, the latter
would assert that a shaft of v/hite light is s im.ply that,
while the former would demonstrate that white lisht is a
combination of all the colors of the rainbow. Early psychol-
ogists regarded introsnect ion as the only method of collecting
facts for their science, but now much lip-ht has been thrown
uDon the way men think by a study of both the structure end
action of the brain. In this connection it is not easy to
get what we call the facts for the simple reason that obser-
vation of a mental state is not possible while the state is
on, all we observe is activity and the state itself is but an
inference from the activity. That a person has experience is
certainly a fact, but what is experience? Is it a thoucrht
process? If so, what sort of thou srht -process? Simply stated,
experience is the referring of an isolated and unrelated fact
to that which is well-knovm, finding a place to put things.
This is far from being a full explanation, it ignores the prob-
lem of causation, but is it unscientific? The problem we are
facing is this: Is the objective alone scientific? Many would
answer with en unqualified, ""^es,"
The attitude that assumes the world of science to be so
well intrenched behind its axiomatic and demonstrable facts
is an attitude more antiquated than modern. We are nov; in
the midst of a period when all the principles of orthodox
science are under fire. The truth is beginning to dawn upon
C
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us that each science is but a partial view of thinpts and is
not Justified in assuming too much for itself. Atoms, elec-
trons, genes, poles, equators, seconds, degrees, ether, are
not so securely established upon their several thrones. There
seems to be just as much reason to posit the existence of
faculties, sensations, instincts, neurosrrams
,
engrams, and
patterns. Dr. Hugo Dingier in his recent Der Zusamrrenbruch
der ^''issenschaf t makes the following most significant statement,
"in modern science, as it is envisaged by its m.ost prominent
leaders, there is absolutely no firm restins" place left. Every
semblance of a foothold which the isolated specialist thought
he had, proves to be non-existent, when we look the entire
(1)
situation squarely in the face." Herbert C. Sanborn in a
recent article says, "Tt is surely a naive misunderstanding
of the actual situation which leads scientists now and then
to claim that science limits itself strictly to 'facts' and
'findings' undefiled by theory and metaphysics; and to speak
of confining oneself to 'facts in their context', of beginning
with a 'minimum of metaphysics' etc., is usually to announce
ones preference for a criven set of assumptions without argu-
(2)
ment," Modern physiological behaviorism is a eood example
of this dogmatic attitude. Its system is rooted in abstraction
from the experienc^i^ing individual, in fact the individual is
destroyed in the denial of consciousness, and the latter is
denied because it cannot be seen and handled. Hence the sys-
tem is purely metaphysical in spite of the fact that the term
(1) Quoted by H. G. Sanborn Methodology and Psychology.
Phil. Review p 141,
(2) Above article. p 17.
I
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is looked upon with such mispiivlns:.
If the psychologist is to be closed up to the observable
and objective he must stand alone; the chemist, the physicist,
the astronomer, the anthropologist, and even the mathematician
refuse to recos^nize any such limitation. The 'la?/ of ^vity*
is an assumption which man has developed to explain falling
bodies, nerve currents are the creation of the physiologists;
all branches of science use conceptual hypotheses to supplement
phenomenal hypotheses. Such concepts are in every case justified
if they help one to understand, predict, and control. If leaving
the realm of observable fact stamps ps7/-chology as unscientific,
the choice must be made between that and the ignoring of great
realms of experience that as yet have not been submitted to
laboratory analysis. In practice if not in theory scientists
agree ;vith Joseph Jastrow that, "Every science--and psychology
is no exception—must be free to develop its own problems and
direct its advance throufth the lead of that tvoe of analysis
(1)
that we call theoretical."
Furthermore when a scientist resolves a mental complex
into its elements he does not answer all the legitimate ques-
tions concerninp" the nature of the experience. "There is
something more in poetry than metrics, something in music
that is not vibrations, something: in our social and ethical
experience that is not a complex of states and consciousness.
Never shall we understand this somethincr by merely reanalyzing
„(2)the mechanism. it is also to be questioned if a person who
has never had a certain experience is so well qualified to
(1) Joseph Jastrow The Reconstruction of Psy.
Psy. Review May 1927. p 176
(2) rreo, A. Coe The Psychology of Religion p 13.
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interpret it as one who has. Analysis is valuable but
doubly so when its limitations are realized.
What then is the relation between psycholoa:y and the
material sciences? Karl Muenzin<7er makes the followinc^ dis-
tinction: A material science finds its basis in abstraction
from the personality of the observer; but life as immediately
experienced can also form the material of a science without
(1)
that abstraction; the latter is more adequate. The chemist
tells us of the constitution of m.atter, the biolos^ist acquaints
us with the structure and history of livinc* creatures, and the
psycholof^is t gives us a workable conception of the mental fac-
tors in orjyanic function, -^ence the field of nsycholoi^y in-
cludes and c'oes beyond that of the material sciences. Sensations
are both material and mental, the mental phases or facts are
non-spatial and private. Y/e must describe them by linkins^
them with events in the physical world. This is not just
theory/ for we do describe inner experiences to one another
and understand them.
Af^ain the warninf?: -vill be sounded that T:e are treadinfr
close to the borderland of metaphysics, for the matter just
discussed leads up to the questions of meaniner and value.
Science we are told must ie;nore value; but does it? Is it
interested in mere facts, a:ood, bad, or indifferent? The very
essence of mental process is meaning. J. S. Moore declares:
"No fact is outs'de the field of scientific invest iG;atlon, but
on the other hand a scientific study of the universe is incom-
plete unless supplemented by a metaphysical interpretation of
(1) Karl F. Muenzinger Physical and Psychological Reality
Psy. Review May 1927 p 220.
ri
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(1)
the truths that science has worked out. "
Pillsbury in his discussion of this same question has
this to say, "Psycholof?y was the latest of the sciences to
separate from philosophy, and the attitude toward many of the
fundamental problems is still profoundly influenced by philo-
(2)
sophical considerations." There is nothinr censurable about
this; it is one thinsr to be dominated by philosophy, it is quite
another to refuse to rule it out entirely. It has already been
noticed that the modern trend is to see truth as a whole and
not as penned off in sections--stockyard fashion. The very
trend of physics today is teleolosrical . The folly of quib-
bling- over the dividino: line between psychology and ohiloso-
phy is becomincr increasingly apparent. Quotins; Muenzinc^er
again, "The history of science since rralileo shows an ever
widening field that is jealously, though not always successfully
guarded against the intrusion of such 'unscientific' concepts
as point of view, quality, purpose and meaning." In a footnote
he adds, "Was the popular interest in the Special Theory of
Relativity due to the fact that here at least the standpoint
of the observer in a restricted sense had to be admitted as a
(3)
primary factor in viewing this -Torld?" Can any function be
discussed out of relation to the end to which it is adjusted?
In some fields of investigation, at least, the scientific ap-
proach to experience must deal with meanings and values. Hov/
can one leave meanings to philosophy in the field of social
ethics. The purely descriptive function of the scientific
(1) J. S. Moore The Foundations of Psychology p 105.
(2) W. B. Pillsbury The Fundamentals of Psychology p 10.
(3) Karl F. Muenzinger Physical and Psy. Reality p 221.
V Psy. Review May 1927.
€
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method which some like to emphasize is largely fallacious.
Indeed function becomes value when it emerp;es from the
biological level.
Nothing; is gained by any attemnt to make of psycholo5;y
a science independen/f^t of bioloory on the one hand and meta-
physics on the other. The structiiral (physiological) and the
functional (consciousness) aspects are both needed. The found-
ation of psychology is to be found in biolot^y; its superstructure,
especially in its causal and puroosive elements does approach •
the realm of metaph^/s ics , and in doing so it is no more un-
scientific than other lines of research which create and use
as tools assumptions that seem to be warranted by the conclusions
already reached. Furthermore it does not seem to be scientific
to emphasize one method of procedure to the exclusion of all
others, nor, on the other hand to condemn any particular one.
Kurt Koffka recognizes three valid methods: (1) Natural
Scientific--observation of the individual in certain situations,
(2) Psycho-phys ical --observation of the individual in certain
situations plus a description of the behavior observed bv the
experimenter and the subject, (3) Pure Psychological--exper-
(1)
iential observation alone. Any treatment of mind is just-
ified if it helps us to understand and control. A true psy-
chology must recognize the fact that each individual lives in
his own psychological world; it must be a psychology of self-
realixation. A developinjr conception is that of the self as an
organizing factor in and growing out of experience; if we are
true to all the facts some such unifying factor seems necessary.
(1) Kurt Koffka The Growth of the Mind pp 24-30.
I
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CONCLUSIONS.
Psychology seeks to describe and understand the exper-
iences and activities of the psychosomatic oreranism.
"liiniat is a fact?" is not a simple question. Some solid
facts are tottering; some shadowy facts are assuming real
proportions.
No science is purely objective. All branches go forward
and mal-ce real progress by way of assumptions
.
Analysis does not answer all the questions; it leaves
the greatest question beyond our reach when it destroys the
whole
.
Psychology includes and goes beyond the ohysical sciences.
It roots in biology, it towers toward metaphysics.
Meaning and value are important phases of psychological
research.
True science takes into account the facts and also the
gaps between the facts; this procedure is by no means peculiar
to psychology.
The final criterion of the science of psychology is to
be found in the turnins; of its data into a discipline that will
be applicable to the interests and progress of the race.
i
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CHAPTER II T.
INSTINCT.
The battle over 'instincts is rae;inf? and is just now at
its hei2;ht. Psycholos^is ts hesitate to say anything?; very
definite, hence the literature on the subject abounds in
glltterina; G;eneralities . Only a minority come out with a
clear-cut statement of their beliefs. The instincts are re-
garded as the sorinffs of action, the drivins?: motives of
conduct, as minor considerations, or as non-existent figments
of the imagination. The verv fact that some can regard them
as all-important while others dismiss them as without any
foundation in fact reveals the chaotic and hodge-podge un-
certainty that shrouds the subject. The best we can do in
this brief review is to sift out a few facts that seem fair-
ly tenable and make what sugjrestions we can upon the basis
of scientifically accepted evidence. The method will be as
follows: First a summary of four theories, each representing
a class or school of thinkers; secondly a discussion of the
major problems that cone under the subject, with the criticisms
and contributions of other writers; and thirdly, a summation
of facts that seem to ooint the way to an understandine: of the
bafflins; problem, if not to an eventual solution.
The most quoted man on the subject of instincts is
William McDougall. His theory in abnreviated form follows:
He accepts the fact of instincts ivithout question and says:
"These all-important and relatively unchanging- tendencies,
which form the basis of human character and will, are of two

main classes :-
1. The specific tendencies or instincts;
2. The general or non-specific tendencies arisinn; out of
the constitution of the mind and the nature of mental process
in G;eneral, v;hen mind and mental process contain a certain
decree of complexity in the course of evolution. Instinctive
actions are displayed in their purest form by animals not
very hi^h in the scale of intellifyence . As an exam.ple he cites
the mason-wasp which paralyzes caterpillars and walls them up
with her e^ars in order that the larvae mis;ht have food, althoucch
she pa7/s no more attention to the nest and cannot have any un-
derstanding of what she is doinp;. "Vet McDougall would also
assert that instincts is somethinn; more than mere innate ten-
dency--it is also the outcome of a mental process initiated
by sense-impression excitins; a complex of sensations having
meaning for the animal. He defines an instinct as an inherited
or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its
possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, ob.iects of a
certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a
particular quality uDon Derceivino- such an obiect, and to act
in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to ex-
(1)
perience an impulse to such action. Concerninpr this doctrine
of impulse which he calls the hormic theory he says in another
book; "The main thesis of this book is that in every case the
motive, when truly assie:ned, will be found to be some instinct-
ive impulse or some conjunction of two or more such impulses.
Take away these instinctive dispositions, with their powerful
(1) 7/m. McDougall Social Psychology Sec. I, Chapter II.
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impulses and the orcranism would become incapable of activity
of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless, like a wonder-
ful clockwork vfhose mainsprine; had been removed, or a steam
ene;ine whose fire had been drawn. The impulses are the mental
forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and
societies, and in them we are confronted with the central mys-
(1)
tery of mind and life and will."
McDougall names seven specific tendencies or instincts,
each with its accompanyinf^ feeling or emotion:
1. Flieiht Fear
2. Repulsion Disgust
3. Curiosity "'onder
4. ^e:nacity Ansjer
5. Self-abasement Subjection
6. Self-assertion Elation
7. Parental Tenderness
Under non-specific tendencies he lists sympathy, su^erested,
(2)
imitation, and nlay.
The hormic theory, the attempt to balance the instincts
and the emotions, and the attributina* of consciousness to
instinct are the outstanding points of the theory.
An opposing theory is to be found in the radical behav-
iorism of John '"atson. Man is an animal witYi certain types
of structure. Having that kind of structure he is forced to
respond to stimuli at birth in certain v/ays--breathing, sneezinfr,
etc. This is man's unlearned behavior and in it there is no
evidence of ;vhat has been called instinct, ''.'e no longer need
that term; all so-called instincts are learned behavior. There
is no such thing as inheritance of capacities, talents, or
characteristics: these are all the result of training.
(1) '"m. HcDougall Outline of Psychology p 218.
(2) " " Social Psychology Sec. I Chaps. ITT-IV.
•
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N'an is a whole animal; he reacts with each and every part of
his body; different names have been siven to activities
resultins from one set of neurones reacting more violently
than others.
Do all men start with the same group of responses?
Only a genetic psychologist is qualified to answer: "yes,
vfithin the limits of individual variation." Black, white, and
yellow babies may look different but racial differences in
behavior are no greater than individual differences. Physical
variations may be laid down in the frerm plasm and anpear in
the offspring. Structure does not determine function but vice
versa. The blacksm.ith and the bookkeeper are structurally
shaped by the lives they lead. An economist had three sons:
the father took the first one under his wing and he too becam.e
an economist; the second son became 'mother's boy' and developed
into a lounge lizard; the tbird son was left to shift for him-
self and became a pervert. Difference in structure in early
training will account for all differences in later behavior;
there is no real evidence of the inheritance of traits. A
healthy well-formed baby of crooks, murderers, or prostitutes
has .just as good a chance as another if brouftht up in the
proper environment. Ivlan:/ born 'moral' go wrong. Dr. '"atson
offers to take a dozen children and make of each at random
rich man, poor m.an, beggar-m.an, thief, doctor, lawyer, merchant,
or \hief. He deplores the ' what-can-you-exoect ' attitude.
Those ;vho are born with structural defects suffer most from the
inferiority complex imposed upon them by others.
Has the boomerang an instinct to return to the hand of
the thrower? The law of physics accounts for its behavior.
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V;hy cannot the psychologists learn here a littl*e lesson In
simplicity? luan's action is likewise a corollary of the v*'ay
in which he is put toj?ether.
Since re cannot tell learned from unlearned behavior b^;-
v/atching an adult we are taken to the laboratory to watch
several hundred infants from birth to thirty days of ap;e ; from
them we learn ^the followins facts ref^ardin?? unlearned responses:
Sneezing, hiccoughing, and crying soon become conditioned.
Erection, voiding of urine, defaecatlon, earl:/" eye movements,
smiling, feeding responses, crawling, grasping, and blinking
all have observable causes. Handedness is a matter of social
usage; it is not an instinct nor is it structurally determined.
The infant is a Graduate student in the subject of learned
responses before 'instincts' such as imitation, rivalr:/-, clean-
liness, etc. appear. Every act has a genetic history, hence
the 'instinct' concept is academic and meaningless. The
'stream of activity' should be substituted for Jam.es' 'Stream
of consciousness'. All men start out equal. What happens
after birth makes one a hewer of wood and a drawer of water.
All are the creatures of habit systems, and personality is
(1)
but the end-product of these systems.
Floyd H. Allport represents a modified form of the be-
havioristic emphasis. He too refuses to use the term instinct
and insists that the sub.lect must be studied from the small
rather than from the larsre end--that is, from the threshold
of life. He regards post-natal development as a general
growth process fac ilitatin?? the formation of habits, rather
John 7/atson Psychologies of 1925 Chapter I.
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than a process of maturation of instincts. LiVe 'Vatson he
sees the behavior of the new-horn infant as a random, poorly
coordinated, unadanted affair, '"hile he decries the use of
the term instinct he recognizes prepotent reflexes and lists
six of them:
1. Start inr^ and vfithdrawing
.
2. Rejecting.
3. StruE^^ling.
4. Huns;er reactions.
5. Sensitive zone reactions.
6 • Sex reactions
.
He also advances the doctrine of chained reflexes, and
gives as an example the complete sexual reaction with the fol-
lowing; three links composing the chain: (1) Internal stimulus,
(2) Discharge, (3) Quiescence. He recognizes also a law of
conditional response and illustrates it as follows: If a v/oman
loves her husband and her home her lover-like responses will
be extended to a new stimulus, the child, which through its
origin as well as through its Immediate presence is closely
connected with the beloved obiects.
Modification proceeds upon the afferent side of the
reflex arc by the process of conditioning I'ust mentioned; on
the efferent side it proceeds by learninp- to solve more and more
complex problems. This progress results in the development
of Drepotent habits at a very early stage in the life of the
organism. Allport makes his distinction between instincts and
prepotent reflexes in order to preserve the influence of en-
vironment
.
(1) Floyd H. Allport Social Psychology Chapter HI.
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The fourth view of Instinct to be presented is that of
the New Psychology ( Psycho-anal^rtic school); A. C. Tansle?/ is
chosen as the spokesman. There are three dominant instincts:
(1) Self -instinct which has for its motive the care of the
individual, (2) Sex-instinct which has for its motive the per-
petuation of the race, and (5) Herd-instinct which has for
its motive man's desire for association with his kind. These
three instincts are the roots from which a c;reat multiplicity
of complexes grow, which, psycholonijically, bear by far the
greater part of the affect of the m.ind, contain the psychical
causes of all the ma.ior conflicts, and determine the greater
part of human conduct. Tansley regards a complex as a well
defined system of ideas and emotions, created in the mind by
the play of experience upon the primary forces of the mind--
which are the instincts. He defines the instincts as certain
innate specific tendencies of the mind that are comnion to all
members of any one sDecles. Each instinct has three fact?ors
:
(1) It is excited by an obiect, (2) It includes mental activi-
ties regarding the object, and (5) It results in action regard-
ing the object. Hence the cognitive, affective and conative
attitudes are all included. Reflex action is a simpler kind
of reaction, but may be ^ust as purposeful as instinct. In
man instinct is transcended but the ends of human activity may
probably all be traced to extensions, conbinations
,
modifications,
or perversions of the primitive instincts. Instinctive action
is often limited by conflict between the instincts, for in-
stance between the herd and the egoistic. Energy can also be
transferred from one instinct to another. Tansley' s view is
(i
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a combination of Pv'^cDougrall ' s biolo(3:ical view of mind and
(1)
certain concepts from Freud and June;.
Wundt, one of the pioneers in the field of modern psycho
logy defined instinct as a form of lapsed intelligence.
"Movements which originall^r followed upon simple or compound
1
voluntary acts, but which have become who^Dly or partly mech-
anized in the course of the individual life or of generic
(2)
evolution, we term instinctive actions." rjordon calls
instincts emotional dispositions and says further that man's
personality and behavior depend upon these instincts vvhich are
(3)
strictly comoarable to those of the animals. Accordinpr to
Shand an instinct is "an inherited disoosition both to be
excited bv certain stimuli and to respond with a soecific kind
(4)
of behavior or expression to such stimuli." Edman regards
an instinct as a native endowment, "an unlearned mechanism for
making a response and an unlearned, tendency to make it, "which
means a combination of native capacity and native desire.
He further says that "instinctive tendencies are the primary
motives and the indisoensable instruments of action, whether
(5)
it be mudpies or metaphysical systems." Another writer
says that instincts "represent elementary, irreducible, innate
(6)
persistent, tendencies." 'Milliam James defined, the term to
mean "the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce cer-
tain ends, without foresight of the ends, and. v^ithout previous
(7)
education in the performance."
(1) A. C. "ansley The New "Psychology Part VI pp 199-297.
(2) Quoted by Pernard Instinct pp 72-73.
(3) R. n. rjordon Personality p 39.
(4) Alex. Shand The TToundations of Character p 182.
(5) Irwin Edman Human Traits pp 18-19.
(6) K. K. Thomson Springs of Human Action p 71.
(7) V/illiam James Principles of Psychology II p 383.
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One who has made a careful study of the whole Droblem has
e;iven us a definition that shows his painstaking thousfht on
the matter. "An instinct is an inborn( in the sense of
inherited )activity process which has remained intact, thatys,
which has not been remade through the process of learning or
of making new adjustments by means of the substitution of nev/
(1)
stimuli or responses for the old ivhich were inherited."
The four theories outlined and the definitions lust
given serve to show how loosely the term instinct has been
used; it has been regarded as a blanket with which to cover
many things which seem inexplicable. Hence it is little wonder
that the very word has fallen into disrepute; a person's use of
the term reveals nothing of his understanding of the subject;
to one it may mean the simplest kind of reaction while to
another it may mean conscious direction. However, the very
fact that the term has been held onto so tenaciously signifies
that there must be something behind it. So we are ready to
ask ourselves the double question: "are there such things as
instincts, and if so, what are they?"
As regards the source of instincts we can say nothing,
except perhaps that here is the root of all the disagreement.
The real source would be the germ for undoubtedly the prenatal
environment has its effect unon the instinctive equipment of
the organism, if such exists. ITPon this insecure foundation
any theory of the instincts must be built.
Reflexes and instincts have much in common and yet it is
(1) L. L. Bernard Instinct p 84.
(9
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possible to make a distinction between the two, althou£?h the
line is very difficult to drav/ . A reflex is the simplest form
of reaction to stimuli; it has to do v^ith some special organ
or locality, v/hile instinct involves the v/hole organism.
The action of the man dozing on the porch in the sunshine and
brushlnP! the ticklin^? fly from his nose is purely reflex. An
instinctive action is usually regarded as more complicated.
Let us refer again to "^atson's argument for the abol-
ition of instincts. The more it is studied the more self-
refuting it becomes. There is no doubt that he has made a
real contribution to psychology in com.pelling Y/riters to' think
about what they have taken for granted, but he assumes too
much. Peca^3fe he found no instincts in his infants he assumed
that there are no instincts at all. The boomerang, he says,
returned to the thrower but had no instinct to do so. Yet it
returned because of its original nature, a broomstick would
not have come back. J/.an acts, at least in part because of the
peculiar equipment of his original nature. Thile '«7atson
denies the inheritance of capacities and tendencies he admits
inherited variations due to structure and inherent in the
germ plasm. Locrically it would follow that certain forms
of activity '.vould spring from this heritable backnround. -le
speaks of unlearned responses, "/hat are they but actions
that cannot be explained without going back to original
nature? :Ie further admits difficulty in determining how much
of certain acts is due to training or conditi oning--in other
words there seems to be an element present that cannot be ruled
out when capacity, instinct, and tendency have been dispensed
9
-51-
with. He admon^i^es us to try hard to think of each unlearned
act as becominc; conditioned shortly after birth, 'fhy and what
of it? It would still remain an ori?^inal unlearned act, which
is very nearly a substitute term for the despised instinct.
Nor can the subject of the maturation of instincts be ignored
and thus disposed of. Instincts may not be apparent at birth--
they may remain latent and anrear at a future stao;e in the
(1)
development of the organism.
Allport^s attempt to p;et rid of the instincts, while less
radical, meets with the same ob .lections. Instead of unlearned
behavior he makes use of orepotent reflexes as a means of
(2)
eliminating instincts. "Thus it turns out that the anti-
inst inctivist Ic social psychology finds that it cannot explain
the fact of the development of the individual organism without
(3)
suminoning instinct to its aid." Somewhere in every theory/
instinct is found sooner or later, v/elcome or not. If it is
impossible to get rid of such a troublesome element even vihen
one tries so hard to do so there must be more to it than a
mere metaphysical assum.ption or postulation.
The lower in the scale of life we go the more likely we
are to find purely instinctive actions. Koffka gi^es us three
examples. (1) The incubator chick hatched itself immediately
pecks at any small ob.iect in its neighborhood. (2) Birds reared
in an artificial nest without parent birds commence building
their own nests when brooding time comes; and the nests they
build are typical for that species of bird in spite of the fact
that they have never been in one or seen one. (3) A squirrel
(1) See pages 24-5.
(2) See page 26.
(3) G. H. Wyatt The Recent Anti-instinctivist ic Attitude
p 131, in Social Psychology Psy. Rev, Mar. 1927
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taken from its nest immediately after birth was reared under
artificial conditions, '^nen o-iven his first nut he 0;na77ed
around it in squirrel fashion and devoured the kernel. Tf
^iven more than he could eat he cached them in some hiding
place for future use, as squirrels do in their natural
habitat. This squirrel had never been on the f^round.
* Concerning these examples Koffka says they "demonstrate that
a livine: being^ can behave in a manner peculiarly suited to its
own existence, or even necessarv to the oeroetuation of the
(1)
species, without any relevant exoerience whatsoever."
Leonard Carmichael in a recent series of experiments with
embryo salamanders which had been anaesthetized durincr their
early development arrived at the conclusion that the organisms
developed by certain processes of a stimulus-response nature
within the organism itself and not by learning, although
(2)
external conditions had some effect.
Max Schoen has recently eriven a very satisfactory answer
to the question under consideration, namely, are there any
instincts? "The answer is 'yes' and 'no', depending on the
definition of instinct, and where it is applied. If hy instinct
is meant simply native behavior, the answer is 'yes'. If it
implies specific forms of native responses the answer is again
'yes', provided v;e agree to include human reflexes under in-
stincts, and provided that vie also recor^nize other forms of
native behavior in the human organism. If, however, the reflexes
are to be excluded, and instinct is to be used as signif^/ing
(1) Kurt Koffka 'Irowth of the Mind pp 87-89.
(2) Development of Pehavior in Vertebrates Experimentally
Removed from the Influence of External Stimulation.
Psy. Review .Tan. 1927 pp 34-47.
i
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native specific behavior, and aonliel indiscriminately froTn
insect to man, then the answer to the question n^ust be an
(1)
unqualified 'no'". Dr. Strickland is substantially in
agreement with this view T/hen he says that v/hile man may not
inherit snecial instincts he does inherit with his organism
(2)
certain capacities for action and feeling.
M. K. Thomson has eiven us s summary which is tenable
enough to be included here in abbreviated form. There is
no pure instinct in actual life; all are prejudiced by habits
from the start, and are constantly altered by social pressure;
they may be and are sublimated. However obscured they may be
by habit and social pressure they determine to some extent the
set or purpose--the sort of thinc^s the individual will be
interested in; they direct the subconscious in many ways; they
acquire new associations but are not thereby destroyed; they
control 8 large part of the individuals stock of general ehergy
and carry the fuse; thev are adaptable in their means of real-
(3)
ization, hence their real strength is seldom fully realized.
Some classifications of instincts have already been
given. Many others could be mentioned but it seems not worth
while. Thorndike recognizes four methods of classification:
1. ^y the functions which the tendencies perform.
2. Ey the responses which are their end- terms.
3. Py the situations which jare their first terms.
4. Py their origin or affirfties in development.
Bernard ?/ould add a fifth based on inner structure and organ-
ization. He has done an amazing piece of work in collecting
(1) Instinct and Man ^sy. Rev, ^^ar. 1927 pp 122.
(2) F. L. Strickland ^sycholocjy of Relip-ious Experience pp 78-9.
(3) ¥., K. Thomson Springs of Human Action p 81.
m
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and classifyino: the classifications. The lists of instincts
which he had gathered covered -^OO tynewritten pacres and the
end not yet in sio:ht. His tabulated results follow:
General Groups of Instincts 849
Specific Instincts 1594
Indefinite and Peculiar Insts. 843
Instinctive totals 2474 Patterns, attitudes.
TOTAL 57H^
(1)
Evidently specific instincts can be multiplied forever. Those
who still classify use the crroup method. Pillsbury names three
(2)
classes very similar to Tansley's:
1. The self -preservative
.
2. The race and family preservative.
3. Welfare of tribe or social unit. (3)
Thorndike recognizes six classes:
1. Self-preservative.
2. Parental.
3. Social.
4. Adaptive.
5. Res;ulative.
6. Resultant or miscellaneous.
All classifications are matters of ODinion. Vore and more
it is be inn: felt that instinct as such is more of a principle
than a set of specific reactions, each discernible from the
other. Bernard is probably rit^ht in his opinion that we can
no lonp:er class activity complexes as instincts. He says further
that actual instincts are much simpler and more elemental than
those classified as such. Including the reflexes there may be
(
hundreds or thousands of these fundamental instinctive reactions.
y/hate^er these original tendencies are they are modifiable
through interaction, learning, or environ/ment . Allport declares
(1) L. L. Pernard Instinct ' p 220.
(2) ',7. P. Pillsbury Fundamentals of Psychology pp 224-5.
(3) E. L. Thorndike Original Nature of Man pp 205-6.
(4) L. L. Pernard Instinct p 522.

that half the process of education consists of transferring
appropriate responses to new and more finely discriminated
(1)
stimuli. Another says "Inhibition of one instinct may
further another, e« s;. in shunnins; society for the sake of
accomplishing a cultural niece of work, we are swaved by the
(2)
will to power in downing our e;regarious instincts." "'ax
Schoen finds a close relationship between native behavior and
intelligence t"Hence native behavior and intelligence are
coextensive, since intelligent behavior means modified native
behavior, and consequently the degree of modif iability of the
(3)
native behavior means the degree of intelligence." For
progress there is then the need for the adjustment of instinct-
ive desires to one another. The Freudians are perfectly
reasonable in their contention that such instinctive desires
should be expressed or controlled, but never suppressed.
Can we now arrive at any conclusion as to whether or
not instincts are vitalistic or mechanical? Does McDougall
with his philosophical impulse psychology furnish a resting
place or must we abide with '''atson and reduce man and his nature
to a simple machine process? Are instincts differentiations
of some elan vital or are they reducible to the laws of
physics? The either-or attitude is impossible, both positions
are untenable, at least if either is held to the exclusion
of the other. At present we can best remain upon some such
mediate ground as the following: The heritable foundation
(1) Floyd Allport Social Psychology p 40.
(2) A. A. Roback Pj»oblems of Personality pl20.
(3) Instincts and Wan Psychological Heview pl23.
Mar. 1927.
0
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of Instinctive action is a fact that none as yet have able to
disprove: indeed their efforts to do so have established it
the more firmly. The heritarre is one of caDacity rather than
of forms of activity. (Altho-ua;h these may seem heritable on
the lower levels of life, for instance: Koffka*s chick, birds,
and squirrel. Such thine;s have not been observed amonf^ humans.)
Much of what has been called instinct has been a product of
trainins; and evolution, "condit ionine;" to use Watson's phrase.
How a m.an does as he does may be explained by mechanics, but
why he does as he does is a question mechanics cannot answer
without calling in the aid of unlearned responses or prepotent
reflexes
.
Instincts never reveal themselves in isolation, but are
alwa^/s mixed with the re^f^xes on the one side , and with
habit and even reason on the other. The quotation from
Schoen on pafre 35 would indicate that much of the misunder-
standin.^ has been a matter of terminology. The prreat com-
plexity of behavior has not been taken into consideration.
One is on safer (ground in us in? the term instinct rather than
instincts especially as anplied to human bein^sj we err in
placing all life from insect to man upon the same plane and
ins is tine; upon the same terminoloe^y throuorhout. So much of
our contention is based upon viewpoint. As '^lenry Rutsrers
Marshall puts it: "if v;hat we call instinct-actions could be
sufficiently slowed down they would show all the characteristics
of adaptive activities; and if what we call adaptive activities
could be sufficiently speeded up they would appear as instinct-
(1)
actions."
(1) Mind and Conduct p 36.
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Many of the instincts the past have been shown to be a
combination of many factors rather than a product of endo7*ment.
For instance the parental instinct has two phases: sustenance
and protection; furthermore it has nutritive, defensive,
offensive, and sportive aspects, hence it is a complicated
thin??:. Perhaps McDouerall was tryino; to account for this
complexity of behavior when he identified emotion with the
affective side of instinct. This is open to three objections:
(1) An instinct may be excited without excitinf^ an emotion,
(Since McDougall defines Instinct as always havincr an af-'^ective
phase, this objection miprht be regarded by some as invalid.)
(2) An emotional system may have several instincts, and (3)
Emotion often comes only '^fter the instinctive action is in
the past. According? to Shand, "Every nrimary emotion tends to
organize in its system all instincts that are serviceable to
its innately-determined end, and to acquire many serviceable
(1)
tendencies which modify such instincts."
Bernard ^ives us four facts dealinc^ with the hereditary
nature of instinct. If bornejf in mind they will help save one
from certain confusions:
1. Hereditary equipment of the new-formed individual is
completed at the point of fertilisation.
organizat ion
2. Only the structurayof the somatic cell is so determined.
3. Somatic structures do not influence the inheritance determiners.
4. Reproductive cells do not transmit the sam.e traits as those
contained in the aer^re^ate somatic structure. (This consideration
would deny the possibilitv of acquired characters.)
(1) The Foundations of Character p 192.
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Hence a person does not inherit an abstract power so much as
(1)
concrete orsians . ^t Bernard does not emphasize the fact that
these concrete organs may contain some such power. (?) Pure
instinct would tien contain no conscious or purposive element
but would be merely functional, and this conclusion is accept-
able. Tatson is correct in his position that pur present use
of the terra includes too much that is sophisticated and learned.
Nature and nurture run too;ether at a very early stag^e in the
life of the or^^anism. Thorndike savs that "orip;inal nature is
not a set of independent mechanisms but a hierarchy of mechanlsm.s
which may cooperate in response to an:^ one situation. Acquired
nature is generated from original nature and recombines with
it to form new hybrids, lline-tenths of what commonly passes
for distinctively human nature is not in' man orierinally , but
is put there by institutions or srows there by the interaction
(2)
of the "orld of natural fdrces and the capacity to learn."
Behavior is a complex of habit and all it includes, and
is interwoven with thought and is a constantly changing ex-
perience. As learnino- and thinkinc develop, instinct becomes
less and less important. "Personality is not an incrusted
entity, but a mutable process, as it were, changinec and growing,
it winfTS free of all such restraints as an instinct philosophy
would imply. It is not driven fatefullv by definitive vitf"'
forces, nor is it harnessed or preformed neural patterns.''
(1) L. L. Bernard Instinct pp 259-265.
(2) Original Nature of Man pp 196-199.
(3) P. F. Valentine Psychology of Personality p 113.
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SUMMARY.
1. Any discussion of instinct is futile without a primary
clarification of terms.
2. The looseness v/ith which the term has been used has
resulted in its "bein^ largely discredited.
3. Reflexes and instincts have much in commonj so much that
no definite line of demarcation can he drawn.
4. Watson's argument for the abolition of instincts altos;ether
is self -refuting.
5. Unlearned responses and prepotent reflexes must be used
In place of the discredited instinct and this is beffgins; the
question.
6. Pure instinctive reactions in man are not observable.
Lower in the scale of life some such do appear.
7. Classifications are rendered futile by their bev/ilderine;
multiplicity and complexity.
6. Orginal tendencies or capacities are not static but
modifiable.
9. Both the vitalistic and the mechanistic doctrines taken
alone are untenable.
10. Laws of biology may answer the how ; the why is elusive;
only by speculation can an answer be driven at present.
11. The complexity of human behavior must not be forgotten,
else confusion will inevitably result.
12. Most of our common instincts are combinations of a number
of different factors.
im
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15. Acquired nature and orio"inal nature are Insenarablv
linked tofyether* in human experif^nce. Personality is not
a static entity but a process.
i€
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CHAPTER IV.
TflE EMOTIONS.
There is so much uncertainty as to what is an adequate
theory of the emotions that I shall in this chapter follow a
rather uncommon method of discussion. First of all a summary
of the views of a number of modern psycholon;ists shall be
c^iven; not all the views hy any means but the principal ones
which havo scholarly reco'rnit ion. This presentation shall be
followed by a f?leaninc- process in which the summaries shall
be examined and those thin^is taken from them which seem to
have good foundation. Tn this connection other authors shall
be quoted as they furnish interest in^?; sidelights on the
phases of the question under discussion.
The follow in? views are given in no particular order
but each is set off by itself under the name of a p^sychologist
who represents the particular school of thought.
FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT.
Emotion is aroused by a stimulus. It Is a diffuse
pattern of response invadinp- both the somatic (outer) and
the visceral (inner) regions of the body. These changes stim-
ulate certain recentors and the following results ensue:
1. Kineasthetic sensations from the movements of arms,
legs, etc,
2. Kineasthetic sensations from the visceral responses,
3. Organic sensations from the visceral responses.
4. Cutaneous sensations from the effects of sympathetic
control in the blood vessels and other structures of the skin.
(J
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'The emotion is connected with the response and not the Der-
ception. ( James -La nf^e theory) The .T-L theory is e-ood as far
as it croes but it fails to distincniish the pattern of response
capable of arousin<? the consciously distinct emotions of
common experience. Every emotion has an affective element
and also some distinctive quality whereby it may be recognized
apart from its affective asDect.
All emotion is classed as pleasant or unpleasant. In
the autonomic nervous system and the viscera we find the
physiolos-ical mechanism which is needed to explain the ahove
.
The Dhys iological antasionism between the cranio-sacral and the
sympathetic portions of the autonom.ic system is the correlate
of this antithesis of affective quality. These two divisions
innervate the same orf^ans , and produce in them exactly opposite
types of reaction. The sympathetic portions function durinrr
unpleasant and the cranio-sacral durinp^ pleasant emotions.
A primitive man is eatincr out In the woods. The cranial
division is at work nroduciner salivary and crlandular secretions
necessary for eatinc* and diiyestin'-'. -Te sees an enemy. The
cranial division ceases to operate. -Tis mouth p:ets dry.
The secretions stop flowin*^. He is in the throes of fear,
an unpleasant emotion.
The chief pleasures of mankind, on the other hand,
center about the cranio-sacral functions of nutrition and
sex. An excention must be made to the statement that cranio-
sacral impulses underlie emotional states e;ene rally: 9;ames,
elation, mirth, etc. possess no discoverable relation to the
cranio-sacral functions. They are apparently due to afferent
CI
0
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impulses from reactions carried out 'hy unimpeded cerebro-
spinal impulses. Tn other words they are somatic rather
tnan visceral in ori^^in.
Unpleasantness is more definite and imperative and is
slower of arousal than pleasantness because the synapses of
the sympathetic ganglia have a higher resistance than those
of the cranio-sacral division. The anger cry in a haby takes
a half minute, while the tickled laugh is immediate. The two
(pleasantness and unpleasantness) are also antasnnis tic . Fach
may inhibit the other. Fear may, as we have seen in the illus-
tration of th^^man eatin? in the field, inhibit pleasant emotion.
Somewhere there must be a differentiating factor which
determins which emotion shall be aroused by a stimulus. This
is found by Allport in the attitude of the individual—whether
he attacks or flees. (J-L theory again) ^ain and Rrief may
pass quickly into anger through a change in the nature of the
somatic responses. The affective component is then the most
primitive ingredient of human emotion.
Unpleasant emotions are aroused when:
1. The stimulus is too intense.
2. It is repeated too often.
3. It is too sudden.
4. The usual somatic response to powerful drives is blocked.
5. The state cf visceral tonus is not such as to make the
individual receptive to the idea. Don't ask Dad for the extra
allowance until after he has had a good dinner.
0
In social behavior it is not unconmon to have both
pleasant and unpleasant elements in complex emotional states.
Certain regions may be under the control of the cranio-sacral
v;hile others are at the same time invaded by the sympathetic.
The danscer of civilization is that all somatic resnonse be
inhibited, thus causino; visceral enerfrizine" effects to be
discharc^ed only inwardly, and nroducins; an extended, inten-
(1)
sified, and lastine^ state of unpleasant internal feeling.
WILLIAM McDOUrrA LL
.
Emotional qualities are not essentially different from
sensory qualities. Conation (strivins:) is a mode of experience
that is often disree^arded because of its subtlety and elusive-
ness . '.Villiam James made it a special kind of sensory exner-
lence . But mental effort cannot be identified with bodily
effort. A person may stronc^ly resolve to produce a weak
muscular action and vice versa. Conative experience is the
felt impulse to action and is present in all emotional experience.
The expressions of the emotions are adaptations of the
body to the modes of instinctive activity proper to the species.
( Darv/inian)
The sum of the adjustments of the nervous system eonstitutes
the emotion. A descendinr?; order of bodily;- adjustment is
accompanied by a diminishinf^ scale of qualities of emotional
excitement] that is, there is a close correspondence between
bodily adjustments and the distinctness of emotional excite-
ment. For instance: The instinct to escape is coupled with
the emotion of fear, while the longing for companionship is
(1) Floyd Henry Allport Social Psychology Chapter IV.
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is accompanied by the emotion called loneliness. A less
distinct adjustment is accompanied by a less distinct emotion.
The James-Ian5;e theory implies a more intimate dependence
of mental process upon bodily chancres than is actually the case.
It is^nores the conative aspect, that an impulsive strivini^
toward a goal is the essence of everj emotional reaction.
Eeinf^ angry involves a tendency to strike, and not the reverse.
Two instinctive impulses may be excited simultaneously,
for instance, fear and curiosity. If the two eannot cooperate,
the stron9;er will inhibit the weaker.
Emotions are of two classes: simple and derived. The
followin?^ considerations mark the distinctions between them:
1. One conditioned by impulse (the latter), the other the
result of thinkins^.
2» The primary sDrinf?"s from instinctive disposition; the
derived arises in the course of operation.
3. The one is a force, the other an incident.
4. The one arises from a disposition orfrani^^ed within the
sentiments, the other arises from no endurinn- disposition.
The primary emotions are from the visceral sense, the derived
(1)
emotions ensue from the operation.
In another work McDoup;all brinp^s out the point that there
is no brain center for feelinp;, also that the facts cannot be
reconciled with any form of Darallelism. He makes conscious-
ness of the meaning of the whole a vital part of the process.
The objects of higher orders which yield aesthetic satisfactions
are constructed by our mental activity--a synthesis of parts
(1) ',7m. I.lcDougall Outline of Psychology Chapters XI-XII.
!
-48
to a unitary whole which, with the feelin^; tone are purely
psychical facts that have no immediate correlates amonT the
"brain processes, ^leasureable and d isas;reeable feelinp;s
determine in part the course of trains of association:
si:nilar tends to follow similar. This has a powerful in-
fluence upon the organic.
A cat is locked in a cage outside of which lies some
tempting food. In strurt'^ling to f?et out the animal rubs
against a hidden latch and the door flies open. On successive
trials this latch is found m.ore quickly until the cat can o-o
right to it. ''Tiy did the particular moveipent become associated
with the particular sense-impression? The answer is that the
pleasure-feeling of success is the link. (This leaves one
in the air however; why does one phase of activity express
itself as pleasure and another phase as displeasure? 'Then we
have enumerated and assembled all the facts something still
(1)
seems to be missing--the osychic side which they possess.)
JOHN 'VATSON.
Emotions as we usually understand them are not inherited.
Study of em.otional behavior must be carried on from the c*enetic
standpoint. The classified illustrations of hereditary res-
ponse to furry animals is an old wives' tale. Such fear
responses are alvmys conditioned. There are three observable
forms of response that can be called out at birth by three
sets of stimuli: fear, rage, and love. These form the nucleus
out of which all future emotional reactions arise. They so
(1) Wra. McDougall Body and Mind Chapter XXII.

quickly become conditioned that they can hardly be called
hereditary modes of response. For instance the fear-response
can be called forth by a loud noise or by removal of support.
A child showed no fear of a lars;e white rat until a loud bell
was sounded close to him each time he reached forth to touch
the rat; the resultant fear of the animal Y;as so e^reat that
the child endeavored to qet away from it. '"/atson regards this
experiment as a far more prolific ??oose for layinr^ i^olden e«^ffs
than James' barren formula. (The theory that e'n.otlonal response
is determined by reaction to stimuli: man fears because he
runs, etc. rather than vice versa.) Emotional response is
conditioned or unconditioned. In the latter all similar
objects call out the response, while in the former it is called
forth only by the oriojinal oblects.
Emotional reactions, then, are built in an order like
most of our other reaction r.atterns. Visceral and nrlandular
factors predominate. Te have never schooled ourselves in
these internal responses, hence many things happen to us
which we cannot talk about. Our emotional life must grow
(1)
and develop like our other sets of habits.
(As in '^'atson's theory of instinct as non-existent he tried
in vain to explain all without rec6urse to heredity so here
he must also find an ultimate basis for emotion in the three
forms of hereditary response. Thile all responses in later
life may be "conditioned" there must be an orlirinal somethinf?
upon which the "condi^onincr" process can operate.)
(1) John Tatson Psychologies of 1925. Chapters IT-ITI.
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LEONARD T. TROLAND.
Sensation is due to a n^^ve activity which takes place
in the cerebral cortex. The unpleasantness must be due to
some property of the activity in the cortex--the discouraQ;e-
ment of the cortical synapses, meanin?T the increasino; of the
resistance of these synapses. Pleasantness is due to the
process of encouragement which is takins^ place in the cortex,
a decreasing of the resistance of the cortical synapses which
are controlling response at the siven moment. Feeline; in con-
sciousness is paralleled by changes in the resistance of the
cortex, but it is only v/hile the resistance is being lowered
that pleasantness exists, and the consequent reduced resistance
is not a condition of this feeling. Feeling is thus related
to a purely dynamic aspect of the brain mechanism. The role
of feeling in consciousness is therefore to represent the rate
at which different forms of response are being built up or
torn down at any moment. If the process is constructive the
feeling is pleasant and vice versa.
The formation of a complex is based upon association of
ideas. Two factors are presented to consciousness simultaneously,
and thereafter each can bring to mind the other. Every moment
of action of the entire system of sensory nerve channels im-
presses itself upon the cerebral cortex in a unified vmy.
The cortex operates and records it as a unit. If a portion of
it is at some future time reproduced it tends to arouse the
oric:inal unitary consciousness. If a doer always associates food
with the ringing of a certain bell he has the bell-food, complex.

Thus are our cortical encoura-^eji^rs and discourac^ers controlled
by some form of sensory stimulation. There are as many com-
plexes as there are encoura0;ers and discouracrers . Freud in
limiting complexes to the sexual e;oes too far. There is
nothing necessarily pathological about a complex. A complex
is a habit-former and as such is the key to an understanding
(1)
of emotional experience.
ED'VARD L. THORNDIKE.
There is almost nothing known of the neurone action
concerned in producing any emotion. Original nature shows a
a multitude of special responses '/yhich act as potent situations
to evoke attention and various adaptive responses from others
(2)
of the species,
ALKXA^JD^R F. SHAND.
James and Lange did not envisage the problem of the play
of the emotions in human life and the fact that the emot'ions
become organized about those things in life we count good.
They did not consider the bearing of their ph77siolo.e:ical theory
on the conception of the emotions as forces consciously or
unconsciously pursuino- ends, ''rhen we define them to include
feeling and perceptions and to exclude their conative aspect
we are no longer troubled with questions of their tendencies.
Fmotion connotes not feeling abstracted from impulse but feeling
with its im.pulse, and feeling which has essentially a cognitive
(1) Leonard T. Troland The Mystery of Mind Chapters IX-X.
(2) Edward L. Thorndike Original Nature of Man Chapter XI.

attitude, however vasue, and frequently definite thouci'hts
about its object. Emotions are forces within us to perform
certain functions; but are imperfect instruments. The
emotional system is as follows:
1. The emotion itself.
2. Processes connected with it in the organism..
3. Its outward expression and modes of behavior.
McDoue;all identifies emotion with the affective aspect
of the operation of an instinct. By so doins^ he obscures the
following facts
:
1. Instinct may be evoked without exciting an emotion.
2. An emotional system may have more than one instinct.
(1) (2
5. The same instinct may be found in different emotions.
MARV CHITON CALKINS.
Emotion is first and foremost an intensely individualizing
experience; both the subject and the object of emotion are
realized as unique and irreplaceable, they are both individ-
ualized. Emotion then, is a personal attitude, a receptive or
passive experie nce--an awareness of being influenced or
affected
•
Emotions are grouped according to relations between
selves and on the pleasant-unpleasant basis. Though they are
other
primarily a realized relation of oneself to ±si^kkxb]QK± selves,
they may also be a relation of oneself to impersonal obiects.
An emotion contains relational elements plus pleasantness or
unpleasantness which are elemental feelings.
(1) Alexander F. Shand The Foundations of Character Chap. I
(2) Quoted on page 37 in re instinct.

The supposed relation between des^ree and duration of
physical stimulation and affective experience is not true to
the facts. There is, rather, a lara;e dependence upon the
unexpectedness and intermittence of the stimulation, ^leasant
ness and unpleasantness are occasioned by the excitation of
fresh or of fatigued cells in the frontal lobes of the brain,
and the frontal lobe is excited by way of neurones from the
Rolandic area of the brain. ^Je may think of pleasantness and
unpleasantness as having the following physiological accom-
paniments :
1. Pleasantness: slow, strong pulse; dilating arteries.
2. Unpleasantness: fast, weak pulse; bodily chill.
3. Pleasantness: auick, weak breathing. )Not so well
)
4. Unpleasantness: slov/, deep breathino" . )substant iated
.
Emotional reactions are either chaotic excess reactions
(somewhat aimless) or coordinated hereditary reactions (sur-
vival reactions from the primitive stage of existence).
Emotion individualizes and makes one sensitive and res-
ponsive to environment. It is indirectly controllable; one
cannot will to be happy but can indulge in those things that
make for his individual happiness. Emotions are harmful when
they interfere with essential habits and if they do not
(1)
stimulate to active consciousness.
(1) Mary Whiton Calkins First Book in Psychology Chap. XI
4
ROBERT S. "TOOD'TORTH.
An emotion is a^moved' or conscious stirred-up state
of mind, or better, of the individual. Organic states are
confused with emotions; it should be realized that they differ
in that the former rise from some bodily process. Anger, for
instance, is an organic state brought about through the func-
tioning of the fflands and the autonomic system. An emotional
state serves as a preparatory reaction. The -Tames-Lange theory
which arrives at the conclusion that emotion consists wholly
of sensations is inadequate since it does not explain why the
internal response in fear and anger are often the same.
We must also distinguish betv;een emotion and. impulse.
An impulse is a conscious tendency. The analysis of the v/hole
emotional process would be something like the following:
1. Stimulus. T'eetinc a bear in the woods.
2* Recognizing dangerous situation.
3. Adjustment towards escape.
4. Internal preparatory reactions and external expressive
(movements
.
5. Conscious stirred-up state.
6. Definitive escape reaction.
7. Satisfaction and quiescence. (Tf you elude the bear.)
Impulse usually generates emotion, but the reverse may happen--
as it does in the case of abnormal fears.
-Emotion consists of internal responses; instinct^ involves
action on external objects. Emotion represents bodily readiness
for instinctive action. Some instincts and emotions are linked
(1)
together. Higher emotions are refined primary emotions,
(1) Robt. S. '^oodworth Psychology Chapter VII.

p. F. VALENTINE.
A pure emotion is an instinctive phenomenon, "beln!?; a
response brought about throue;h an inherited neural mechanism.
?Ie must e;o to the infant to find such pure emotions for they
soon become modified by environment. Emotions often arise
only after interpretation of the stimulus, ^ence, we have
certain simple and elementary emotions which become modified,
multiplied and amplified by experience. The Tames -Lanere theory
m.ay be true in its essence but it does not differentiate the
emotions. 'Vhy does fear differ from rage? "'hy do both differ
from pleasurable excitement? Fear and rage are the same in
adrenal, liver, stomach, and heart action, and in arterial
tension. Allport says that the difference is to be found in
the total muscular response] in fear one is 'set' for escape,
(1)
in rage for combat.
Is consciousness a by-nroduct or one of the adjustments?
It seems to be on a par with the bodily reactions, indeed it
may be spontaneous vvith the reaction. The consciousness of
rage may arise from the reaction but how potent it becomes in
the situation.
^^'hy are some emotions pleasant and some unpleasant?
The sympathetic and cranio-sacral divisions of the autonomic
system may furnish helpful explanation. Qualitative differences
among the secondary emotions are probably best explained by
recognizing the complex nature of our habit organizations.
It is a matter of the sum-total of our responses. Emotional
differences in people are due to bio-chemical conditions in
(1) Floyd H. Allport Social Psychology pp 91-93.

the neural structure. Smooth runnina: or inpeded brain action
pleasant and (1)
are the causes ofyoinpleasant feelings accordin?^ to Woodworth;
this idea does not fit the facts since unpleasant stimuli
may prompt a smooth-runnins^ reaction. It is habit that makes
action run smoothly. All theories of pleasantness and un-
pleasantness have strons and weak points, '-e are capable of
(1) pleasure tinged feelings when the familiar physical and
mental habit-activities are unimpeded, (2) anger tinged feelings
when an agent before which we feel relatively stronpr and com-
petent threatens to deprive us of familiar habit-activities,
or to thrust activities upon us which in some way conflict
with our organization at that moment of experience, (3) and
fear tinged feelings '.vhen our ma.lor habit-activities are threat-
ened by a force or mysterious agency before which we feel
actual incompetence.
Emotions can become attached to objects that do not
originally evoke the emotion. ('Vatson's baby-rat-noise
experiment is cited). Our primary emotions are passed on
and built up. Then one's habits become compacted about an
object or idea to the extent that his feeling is involved,
he will construct his thinking to accomodate and sust^ain
(2)
the feeling.
(1) Psychology paa;e 172.
(2) P. F. Valentine The Psychology of Personality Chap. V.
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CONCLUSIONS.
It is not the purpose of this section of the chapter
to present a new theory of the emotions, but to indicate
certain thin/^s upon which it would seem one mie:ht be able
to depend; we hesitate to call them facts, but they may
serve that purpose as a basis for further study. The
limitations one has to face will also be indicated. For
the sake of clarity the different phases examined will be
enumerated and set apart from each other. The arrangement
is neither historical nor loe^ical; it cannot be as lon^ as
our knowledge of the subject is so limited.
1. The indications are that the emotions have no
definite center in the brain. Neurone action undoubtedly
takes Dlace in emotion, but so far we must a^-ree with
(1)
Thorndike that nothin?^ definite can be said about it.
Woodworth is of the opinion that the thalamus has some
(2)
definite relation to feeling and emotion. The British
neurologist Head goes farther and asserts that the activity
of the thalamus alone can account for the Dresence of pain
(3)
in consciousness, and Troland says in his support that, "the
pain conductors have a definite center here, while the other
nerves merely pass through the thalamus as a wav station
(4)
en route to the cerebral cortex." There seems to be crood.
reason for accepting the theory that the antagonism between
the cranio-sacral and the sympathetic systems has much to do
with what any particular emotion may be. It is quite plain
(1) See pa^e 51.
(2) Psychology page 65.
(3) Quoted by Troland Mystery of T.Und p 70.
(4) r.^ystery of Mind p 69.

that emotion affects the whole of the individual and cannot
be localized.
2. "Emotions, as such, are not inherited but we have
as yet no reason to say that emotional tendencies are not
inherited, ^"atson's doctrine of learned responses does not
(1)
account for the origin of the responses with which he begins.
Thorndike's contention that original nature is the basis of
emotion, while it does not account for all the facts, does
(2)
explain some not accounted for in any other way. Emotion
does have a close relation to instinct, although we can hardly
(3)
go all the way with I'cDougall in ^airing them off. Emotion
involves internal responses while instinct is outwardly direct-
ed; emotion is a preparatory reaction while instinct is an
end reaction; the tv;o are not identical nor are they invar-
iably associated. A fly may liffht on a man's nose and be
brushed away without emotion; if it returns reDeatedly
(which it commonly does) the owner of the nose will p;et
angry. Most investigators recognize certain primary emotions.
In a recent interestinrr article M. 'Aarston listed the
following primary emotions as the outcome of his experiments:
1. Dominance : -reenforcemient reflexes set off by an opposition
stim^alus. (The bab?/- fierhtine against being forcibly held.)
2. Compl iance : -control of tonic motor discharge by a phasic
reflex. (The baby reaching for a toy.)
2. Submission: -yielding to responses evoked by a stimulus.
4. Inducement : -reenforcement of submission response to
induce further submission from another individual. (Two
(l)See page 49. (2) See page 51. (3) See page 47.
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(1)
lovers each subnittinf? to the domination of the other.).
3. An emotion is aroused by a stimulus. It -nay be an
internal or an external stimulus. Indeed it need not be even
physical unless one reduces meditation and such processes to
the physical.
4. Emotion has a distinctive quality. It is more than
the sura of bodily adjustments, more than an affective aspect.
This is in disagreement with ^cDoue^all 7/ho places emotional
(2)
and sensory qualities on the same plane, and in agreement
with Miss Calkins who declares that the supposed relation
between degree and duration of physical stimulus is not true
(3)
to the facts. Shand's criticism of McDougall's theory seems
(4)
to be well-founded.
5. Emotion cannot be reduced to lust feelings of
pleasantness and unpleasantness. There is no dividing line
between the two. A single emotion may have both elements
and often does. Valentine says that our habit organizations
(5)
must be taken into consideration here. The degree of
resistance in the cortical synapses answers some questions,
(6)
but the why of these degrees of resistance remains obscure.
6. It will be noticed that most of the psycholos:ists
recognize the James -Lange theory as inadequate in that it
does not distinguish pattern of response capable of arousing
the different emotions. The theory functions on the lo7/er
levels of life but becomes increasingly barren as we ascend
in the scale of mental organization. The movements accounted
(1) '". ¥. r/arston ^rimary "^motions I'sy. Rev. "^ar
Sept. 1927, op 336-363.
(2) Page 47. (5) T^age 53. (4) Page 52. (5) ^age 56.
(6) Troland, page 50.
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for by this theory are not of the consciously directed sort.
7. Emotions cannot be reduced to an ultima, Ve know
some facts concernin'r them but not enour^h to reduce them to
(1) (2)
learned behavior, or to identify them with sensation, or
to explain them SATISFACTORILY on a purely physiological basis.
8. Experiment in the field of emotion oroduces some
stratifying results but is also disheartening^ in some respects.
"The bodily effects of all types of emotional stimuli, moreover,
are alv/ays e^reatly changed and diminished, frequently disapnear-
ins; altogether, if the experimenter fails to put himself and
the experimental conditions 'en rapport' v/ith the sub.lect,
protective resistance to control of his emotions havinfT be-
come neeessarilv, the most habitual of all motor attitudes
(3)
in the normal human adult." Even by the introspective method
we are frustrated, for the emotion is gone as soon as we begin
the analytic pr6cess, and all we can analyze is the memory of it.
9. There is a close relationship between emotional ex-
perience and the functioning^ of the glands. Cannon demonstratss
this convincingly in his experiments, shows that taste,
smell, and sight of food start the digestive process, it not
(4)
being necessary to put food into the stomach. Impulses in
the sympathetic system augment the secretion of the adrenals;
c (5)
pain has the same funtion. Emotional excitement increases
^ (6)
the suear in the blood. Goasrulation of the blood is hastened
(7)
by pain and emotion. Yarston has the following criticism to
offer: "Cannon does not differentiate the emoti/ons sufficiently.
(1
(2
(3
(4
(5
(7
"/atson, oacre 49.
McBougall, page 47.
'.larston Primary Emotions ^sy. Rev. pp ^7)9.
Cannon Bodily Changes in "^ain. Rage, Hunger, and Fear
Ibid pp51-9. (6) Ibid pp59-60. (P 5.
Ibid p 135-
.
f
He points out phvs iolo3;lcal similarities, but no measureable
(1)
differences between these major emotions." The divisions
are not as clear cut as Cannon makes them. For instance he
assumes that the sympathetic system is always activated by
fear but he also cites va^us impulses as other effects of fear.
10. Emotion has a psychic quality. It is elusive but
it cannot be ruled out on that account, "fhy do we feel so and
so under certain circumstances? ^fhy will a stimulus deli=»;ht
at one time and bore to tears at another? 'Aiss Cslkln's
theory of fresh and faticrued cells in the frontal lobe of
the brain furnishes a phys ioloe;ical answer to the last
question, it is true; but that does not take into account
popularly
that which is jaxapaKiy called 'mood* • 'lo^ can we tell whether
a symphony or a comedy will appeal most stronG;ly tomorrow
nis;ht? (Provided we do enloy either occasionally.) This
of course introduces us to the unanalyzable conceot of per-
sonality. Two of us mi<7ht s;o to the s^mphonyj one 7;ould
enjoy it, the other would not. The stimulus is the same;
differences in the orf^anism cannot account for the different
emotions aroiised. So v^e are face to face with the crucial
question: "llov^ does emotional experience influence the subject?
Miss Calkins Is undoubtedly correct in her assumption that
both the subject and the object of emotion are realized as
(5)
unique and irreplaceable. She would say further that the
self creates the emotion as a result of environmental influence
Quoting Marston as;ain, "The differential factor in emotion is
(1) Wars ton Primary "^motions Psy. Rev. d 337,
(2) Cannon Bodily Chan<3;es in Pain, Ras;e , -lunrsier, and Fear.
{3){4) See pa0;es 52-3. pp 51-60.
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not arrived at until after the orie^inal sensory imoulses
elicited by the emotional stimulus succeed in affecting^
relat ionshit) somewhere in the central nervous system with a
(1)
distinctive pattern of motor dischar2:e paths." It follows
from this that we cannot hone to find in any combination of
sensation factors the peculiar character of an emotion*
Furthermore since the true receptors for emotional stimulus
lie within the ors;ani3m it avails nothing; to stimulate the
same sense organs in different people.
An interesting; sidelif!;ht on this phase of the quest'on
appears in anarticle by ilelen Roberts in the Psychological
Review for Nov. 1927, A native Indian sang for the phonogranh
eleven different songs over and over again: thirty-four repe-
titions in all. sVhile fresh he tended to attenuate up and down
trending melodic curves, sometimes sharping or flatting. When
tired the tendenc7f was toward acuation, especially in five repe-
itions of a song he disliked. In other words, he gave to the
phonograph an unconscious record of his emotions.
11. Emotions may be exDresaed or inhibited and work
good or harm. Inhibited emotions are usually harmful. Disuse
tends to atrophy both the finer and the baser feelings. Our
modern civilization is not conducive to the buildin? of charac-
ter. Emotionless people are dull people. A perfect man would
be one in whom every emotion is in balance with its onposite,
but he would be a bore. Emotions are safety valves, if they
are good they should be expressed; if they are bad they should
be sublimated and then expressed; thus emotional control is
poss ible
•
(1) Marston Primary Emotions Psy. Rev. p 340.
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CHAPTER V.
This is not a new battlefield but merely a portion of
the same one upon which v;e have been witnessing the charj^es
and countercharges of ODposinn; forces; hence v/e would expect
a similar alis;nment of those forces here and such is the case.
'Vhat is meaning? If we base mind upon sensation and seek to
understand it structural ana^lysis alone we may produce a
very plausible explanat ion--al least as far as the lower
levels of life are concerned. If in addition to structural
analysis we seek the why, the purposive or teleoloc?:ical el-
em.ent--if we^ seek ends as well as beginnings, then our ex-
planation must needs so deeper and be less dogmatic. (This
aura of uncertainty it is that causes some to cry, "rnsc lent iffc I"
)
A brief and temporary definition of meaninrr micrht be
"consciousness of relations." Much simple meaning is con-
sciousness of utility or adaptation, arising* our of sense
experience but not fully explainable by experience. The
baby of the family sees daddy put on his hat a tim.e or t'.7o and
grasps the meanine; that a hat is to be put on the head,
Allport f^ives us a o-ood modern analysis of the problem
from the sensation standpoint. He finds the foundation of the
learning process in the conditioned reflex which may be des-
cribed as an afferent neural pathway acquiring new efferent
outlets. "No single law of human or animal behavior is of
more far-reaching significance. Half of the process of ed-
ucation consists of transferrinp; anpropriate responses to new
(1)
and more finely discriminated stimuli." The responses of the
(1) Floyd Allport Social Psychology p 40.
CI
1
infant soon become "conditioned." The attitude toward the hot
stove is entirely different after the child has sustained a
burn. Certain selective movements are made accordin?: to the
trial and error process; these oa^^-ry out the function of the
reflex. Successful movements result in the fixation of re-
flex arcs. In the hiig-hest development of the reflexes the
cortex is involved; this means reasoning. Thoup-ht is an a-
bridged and hicrhly efficient form of trial and chance success
in the consummation of the prepotent reflexes. The supreme
drive of the learnine^ process is hunger; next is sex. Con-
ditioned reflexes are formed with unusual facility under
conditions of em.otional excitement, prode^uced bv autonom.ic
(1)
responses to the stimuli employed.
•^oodworth voices the same idea as does Allport when he
says that acquired reactions are modified native reactions,.
and when he bases all motor acts on the reflexes. The learning
process is a process of s trene-thening, fixing, and combining
movem.ents, and of new attachments and detachments between
stimulus and response. He ^ives us a summarv of animal
(2)
learning which has its significance for humans:
1. Response to stimulus is eliminated when,
a. It brings pain.
b. It brings failure.
c. The results is negative adaptation, ('^ettinct used
to things and thus paying no attention to them.
)
2. Attachments or linkages:
a. Substitute stimulus. (Dop* associating: food v/ith
ringing of bell.)
b. Substitute response. (A new reaction attached to
the original stimulus.)
3. TJew combinations of responses "'ivin<? higher motor units.
(1) Floyd Allport Social Psychology Chapters TI-III
(2) R. S. '.Voodworth Psychology " XIII.
>_
Thorndike also le cries any theory that tends to take
into consideration any element that is not observable. 'le
throws out of court the following which he lists and calls
three current popular opinions:
1. Attention, memory, reasoning, and choice are mysterious
powers that load the dice in favor of certain reactions. He
dismisses this as too naive for consideration.
2. Perception of response in connection with stimulus in
another* s behavior creates a bond between response and stim-
ulus in the perceivinfT individual. The obiection to this view
lies in the fact that no evidence can be produced to prove it.
3. Ideo-motor action: the idea of an act or the result of
an act tends to produce the act. About this he says: "The
idea has to be connected with the movement or to the sensory
stimuli to which the movem.ent is the response by exercise or
affect before it has an iota of efficiency in awakening the
(1)
movement."
Turning to the other school of thoucrht we expect, of
course, to find Dr. McDougall . He denies the validity of the
association idea and declares that the mind does not bep-in by
acquiring ideas of distinct particular objects. Associationism
describes mental development as beginnins?! with the co^rnition of
particulars and advancinp" to cognition of the more general,
whereas, in reality, we bep-in by cognition of the hic-hly general
and progress naturally to the cognition of particulars,
rjrowth of the mind is a threefold process of discrimination,
(1) E. L. Thorndike Original Nature of ^'^an pp 174-181.
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appercept ion, and association. By apperception he means the
process wherety one discerns the essential similarities be-
tween objects and classes of obiects ivhich we have learned to
discriminate and distinf:^uish from one another. This results
in the formation of systems. Association does not make ideas
as per the older idea, it merely connects ideas or disDositions
previously formed and previously differentiated by discrimination
product
and logicellv ordered by apoerceot ion. The fyeneral/KjSRidHBltis
(1) ^
a mind that is a network of cross-connections. The apper-
ceptive process is the point wherein McDougall's theory differs
(2)
from the reflex, trial and error theory of Allport; the for-
(3)
mer gives the same emphasis to the conative impulse that
(4)
the latter r-ives to the conditioned reflex. McDougall
finds in the 'hormic' element of all behavior an aspect of
conscious experience which defies laboratory anal7/sis.
(The charge that this is a philosophical concept carried
over into psychology is not without foundation.)
Pillsbury links the two terms meaninc: and concept since
he declares that neither would have any significance were it
not for the other. Meaninp* is the fact that one bit of mental
content represents or stands for somethlnt^ else. At first it
is little more than a mere process of assoc^iation or connection
throue;h contifyuity. A baby stops cryin^r when it sees the
bottle corainE;] a man's name recalls the picture of the man.
And since it is possible to dissociate meaninn- from the word,
Plllsbury reasons that meaninn; is conscious, ''foodworth
(1) Im, ^TcDoucrall Outline of Psycholos;y Chapter XV.
(2) (4) See ^af^es 65-6.
(3) See Page 46.
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recoe^nizes the possibility of a certain kind of iman-eless
(1)
meanin£3;. In speaVin^: of concepts ^illsbury says that they
develop from sensory i^a5;es and are eiradually divorced from
them. Knowlede;e is a system of such concepts; we understand
that which can be referred to a concept, without them not even
(2)
consciousness is possible.
Coffin recorrnizes two laws of learning: ass im.ilat ion
and orfranization. The first law is apparent in the presence
of a stranee oblect in the child's field of consciousness
which is to him a sufficient stimulus to cause his reaction
to it; he reaches out mentally as well as physically to
assimilate it by relatine; it to his past experience. The
object is perceived and classified according to his past
knowledge; the snow is Dieces of white paper falliner, the
fern is a pot of f?reen feathers, and the scissors are asleeo
when closed and awake when opened. The second law includes
mental discrimination and differentiation. A man and a do^
looking; at an automobile see two entirely different thine;s
.
Coffin likewise e'ives larc^e place to the element of con-
(3)
sciousness in meaning.
Accordin»2; to Spearman all learnlne" starts with the
sensory states of quality, intensity, spatiality, and
temporality. Any lived experience tends to evoke immediately
a knowing of its characters and the experiencer; and the
mental presentation of any two or more characters tends to
evoke Immediately a knov/ino- of relation between them; it
(1) R. S. Toodworth Psychology p 374.
(2) T. 3. Pillsbury Fundamentals of Psy. Chapter XIII.
(3) J. H. Coffin Personality in the Making " IV.
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follo'.vs froTi this that the presentinr; of any character with
any relation tends to evoke immediately a knowing of the
(1)
correlative character.
Homer ^5. Reed in a recent article denlores the crreat
multiplicity of laws of learnine;, likens them to Tames*
'blooming, buzzins;, confusion' and then gives us three more,
or rather he endeavors to sather up all laws that are worth
while and restate them in concise fashion. He recognizes the
problem to be threefold:
1. The formation of connections.
2* The strength of connections,
3. The elimination of false reactions.
Under (1) he restates three laws: First--the law of continuity
If one of a series of reactions is repeatedly made to a Troup
of contiguous stimuli, one of these stim.uli will later be
sufficient to provoke this reaction or series of reactions.
This restatement is supposed to take account of the necessity
of response. Second--the law of s imilarity--to make it agree
with the stimulus -response concept: If an oreranism meets in
a new situation elements similar to those to which it has made
response before, it has a tendency to repeat these reactions.
Third--the law of relationship—relationships are observed
in croups of stimuli and then adaptive reactions are made to
them. These three laws then account for the formation of con-
nections. The streno-th of connections is explained by the
law of exercise and its sub-laws of frequency, recency, and
intensity. The elimination of false reactions is explained
by the lav/ of effect. (Trial and error method.) This appears
(1)C. Spearman The Nature of Intelligence and the
Principles of Cognition. Chapter IV.
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to be another straip-ht sensat ionist-systeTn, but Reed leaves
a place for what he calls 'set;' a s-eneral neural trend
that controls the operation of all the lav/s with respect to
adapt ibility. The what and the why of the neural trend Is
(1)
not stated.
A recent theory which is havins: much discussion in con-
nection with the TTieanin*^ problem 4s that of the ^estalt,
another form of protest a^iainst atomistic psycholosiy
.
Humphrey has G;iven the theory a concise statement: "First,
that the structure is more than its parts --the example friven
in the original connection is that if the notes of a melody
are each given to a different man, the resulting effect is
not the melody, to obtain which the parts m.ust be brought
into functional relationship with one another; second, the
structure can be transposed (may occur with specifically
different tones:) third, which is added by xBhler, is that
(2)
the separation brings alteration of the parts." Conscious
experience is regarded not as a bundle of sensations but as
a unit, the grasping of patterns rather than isolated units
of content. The supporters of the theory have based their
conclusions on two lines of investigation: (1) An experimental
study of human experiences mainly conceptual, and (2) A study
of the behavior of animals indicating the unitary character
of many experiences. They have striven to show that a per-
ception cannot be merely a number of elements of experience,
but that it must have a structure of its own; all perceptions
must be structural totalities before the:;- can be perceptions.
(1) Homer R. Reed The Essential Laws of Learnin?? or
Association. ^sy. Rev. pp 107-115,
(2) Quoted by J. B. '.'iner in ^sy. 5ev. Jan. 1927. p 19.
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K5hler in his experiments ^ith the apes has rnade perhaps the
most notable contribution to the theory. Here is one of his
conclusions: "in the field of the experiments carried out here
the insight of the chimpanzee shows itself to be principally
determined by his optical apprehension of the situation; at
times he even starts solving; problems from a too visual point
of view, and in many cases in which the chimpanzee stops act-
ing with insight, it may have been simply that the lay of the
land was too much for his visual grasp (relative weakness of
shape perception)." "it is therefore difficult to give a sat-
isfactory explanation of all his performances, so lone as no
detailed theory of shape (f^restalt) has been laid as a foundation.
The need for such a theory will be felt the more, when one
remembers that solutions showing -insight in this field of
intelligence necessarily take part in the nature of the struc-
ture of the situations, insofar as they arise in dynamic pro-
(1)
cesses co-ordinated with the situation."
Mental phenomena are not regarded as static, but as a
stream in which all of the past and indeed all of the future
are blended. This means a new relatedness of present sensation
with images and knowledge previously gained as a result of
engraphic reaction. (An ens-ram beln^ the structural organi-
zation of the orrranism which determines response to stimuli.)
This results in the emergence of a new perception, each of
which is a true emergent, coherent in itself, and having its
own organization and form; this is its essential nature, part
of a perception is meaningless. The significance of this for
(1) 7/olfgang KBhler Mentality of Apes pp 277-8.
m
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the learninnr process is readily seen. It would follow that
the mentally weak could experience r-estalten of a simple
nature only.
Koffka applies these orinciples to the infant, declar-
ins; that the consciousness of the new-born babe is more than
a confused mass of separate sensations which he prradually
learns to associate. The behavior of an infant does not ' sup;n;est
the presumption that experience is ma\^e of perceptions by
the assoc iat ional ?nethod. There is no ,Q;ood reason to assume
that the new-born child possesses an abundance of mental phen-
omena; in fact the contrary is indicated by the observation
that there are but few motives that can set him in action.
If the theory of oriiiinal chaos were correct one would ex-
pect that the simplest sort of stimuli would s-et the best
response, but the infant reacts more stronsil?/- to the complex,
for example: the human voice and the human face are complex
stimuli, yet they Piain a stroma response, the infant respondins;
to an aniry face differently than he does to a smilinc^ face.
It is further stated that the first experience of a child is
that of a figure on a background; from this em.ers-es the qual-
ity called conf i?yuration. (Kfthler does not like this term.
He says: "T do not think that the term ' conf induration' is
quite adequate as a translation of the '^-erm&n word ^-estalt.
The word ' conf i.<Turat ion seems to mean elements put tof^iether
in a certain manner, and this is a functional idea which we
(1)
must carefully avoid.") If this quality is not f^rasped
the fif^ure is not seen. This is demonstrated in the case of
(1) W. Kbhler Psycholop;ies of 1925 p 180.
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(1)
patients in certain subnormal physical conditions. Koffka
illustrates this by a test he made with hens wherein he trained
them to choose the lighter of two pieces of (^ray paper as a
means of procurincr food. V/hen the darker of the two papers
was removed and one lighter than the remainins: one put in its
place the hen did not tend to return to the one whereon she
obtained food before, but to the ne-vly added piece, indicatinc;
that the original stimulus was not that of a certain shade but
(2)
rather of a certain quality as compared with the other.
Thw Y/hol*e theory assumes that a certain order dominates
experience from the beginninsrj in other words order precedes
rather than follows experience. If this is so it does shed
considerable licrht on the early development of consciousness
and has real peda??o(?ical value.
In criticism of the theory it mip-ht be said that it is
in danger of assuming; too much for itself, a common fault of
new theories. Miner asks the significant question: "May not
purposive striving and the Gestalt be instances of the p-enetic
sequence in which a new characteristic appears durinp* the
sequence or with the end result? In other words, are not the
(5)
Gestalt and purposive striving genetic sequences?" Further-
more analysis does not necessarily mean atomism as the theory
seems to assume. It also tends to overlook the experiencing
individual as a unifying principle. In justice however, it
must be admitted that the theory helps mightily at the time
when experience seems to be fretting under way and before there
(1) Kurt Koffka Growth of the Mind pp 140-42.
(2) Same p 138.
(3) T. B. T^ner Psy. Review, Jan. 1927. p 23.

is any adequate person to do the or<^anizins; . The significant
point in the whole thing is that situations, not units, are
the important elements of growinp- experience.
Koffka also gives us liorht on another aspect of the sub-
ject. Mental development, he says, is in four directions:
1. i^otor learninrr seen in walking, reaching, playin?:, etc.
2. Sensory learning in color perception, space recognition,
etc
.
3. Sensory-motor learning? in imitation, shunning burns
and hurts , etc
.
4. Ideational learning in use of language, when thinp:s are
• named and counted.
'^le makes all learnincr depend upon memory, and his point is
easily seen. At birth the infant's behavior shows that mem-
ory images participate but little, when they do they are tied
up with perception, and are without temporal or spatial def-
inition. The infant completes some objective act of behavior
which soon comes to involve a true component of learning.
The background of consciousness acquires a fixed level upon
(1)
which separate phenomena make their appearance. ( Broad
up
asks the following question and then sums ^^the answer to it
in eight points: "'"hat is the mind doing when it is perceiving
a material object?"
1. The perceptual situation contains two constituents, one
objective and the other subjective*
2. The objective constituent is a sense-field with a certain
outstandinc^ sensum, the latter being the objective phase of the
perceptual situation.
(1) Kurt Koffka Growth of the Mind pp 143-150.
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3. The subjective constituent is a mass of bodily feel inn*,
toQ;ether with certain specific emotions, muscular sensations,
feelings of familiarity, etc.
4. The latter are produced through the excitement of cer-
tain traces by the apprehension of the sensum.
5. The sensum is apprehended by entering into a certain
specific relation with the f^-eneral mass of bodily feeling.
6. The situation has a certain soecific external reference
in virtue of a certain soecif ic relation between the apprehended
sensum and its mnemic consequences in the way of feelinsj, etc,
(These mnemic traces are lasting modifications impressed on
the organism as a result of activation on some previous
occasion.
)
7. Pure sensation is an ideal limit, approached as exter-
nal reference !?rows vaguer and vaguer.
8. The notion of a physical object is not abstracted from
the data of sense. It is a category of the mind.
Thus it appears that Broad recognizes that unobservable soraethinrr
over and above sensation.
The relation of the subconscious to the learninsr process
is so vague and uncertain as yet that nothino- very factual
can be said about it. Jung defines it as the sum of all
those psychological events which are not annerceived, those
psychological elements which cannot pass the threshold into
commonly reported fact that a telegraph operator can sleep on
(1)
(1) C. D. Proad Wind and its "^lace in Nature
(2) c. 0. Jung Analytic Psychology
(3) Joseph Jastrow The Subconscious
pp 218-220.
p 278.
P 78.
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while his instrument ticks continually, but will awaken the
instant his own call comes. Some sort of selective attention
would seem to have been ^oinrr on while he slept. "Tartini
heard the devil plav a wonderful sonata and on awakening he
(1)
was able to set it down." The mystery, however, does not
C
have that eerie quality of the Completely unknowable for "the
pr6cesses that come to lijrht conform to the typical conscious
association of ideas; whenever we successfully trace the steps
of an intent, deliberate sequence of thou^^ht, like the
spider climbins: back by absorbing the thread that has just
been launched we come upon lust such links and ties in the
(2)
mental chain." "There exists in all intellectual endeavor
a period of incubation, a process in <^reat part subconscious,
(3)
a slow maturinj^ through absorption of suitable pabulum."
Undoubtedly the subconscious is some sort of storehouse upon
which the mind can draw in some peculiar way. Try as I may
I cannot think of the name I wantj I give up and turn my
mind to other matters and become suddenly aware that the name
sought for has come into consciousness.
The problem of meanin<y also involves that of reasoning.
According to Fillsbury reasoning is called into operation
because of the lack of ^ suitable concept to which a diffi-
culty can be referred; one after another is tried until one
is found that fits the need and the process is then completed,
(4)
the result being belief or proof. Edman says that reflec-
tion begins either in a maladjustment between the individual
(1) Joseph Jastrow The Subconscious p 75.
(2) " " " " p 77.
(S) " " " " P 99.
(4)iY. B. Pillsbury Fundamentals of Psychology p 425.
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and his environment or in a conflict of impulses within the
(1)
same person; it is not a thine; but a process. CTordon sees
(2)
the process as a movement amone: the ene^rams . "in this pro-
cess, every efferent conation of one eni^ram, becomes immed-
iately an afferent cognition for the next, and hence thou<7:ht
is a development on the cognitive side, and, by reason of the
cortical functions of integration and discrimination, one thoup:ht
can be compared with another. Thought may be the mental cor-
relate of the activation of eognitive neurones in the higher
(5)
realms of the cortex." Hence, reflection is but another
expression of need, an effort of man to better himself in
some way. His habits or instincts aid or impair his nower
of reflection, so while all the questions concerninp* it can-
not be answered, it is possible to exercise rreat control over
it.
An interesting aspect of this subject of meaning is the
part played by attitude. An attitude is a high level of at-
tention directed toward some object; it is accompanied by
emotion and nearly always by some drive or urge of some sort;
it has, also, a prominent cognitive element. Instincts,
emotions, training, suggestion, and imitation all furnish a
basis for attitude. A man's attitudes are his mental habit-
systems. The:/ are points of departure. 7/hile they have a
solid basis they are at the same time greatly modifiable.
(1) Irwin Edman Human Traits p 48.
(2) (5) R. ^-ordon Personal itv p 99.
*
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CONCLUSIONS.
1. The problem of meaning: is sub lect to one of tTio ma lor
emphases: sensationalism or purpose (conation, teleoloj^y, etc.)
2. The majority of thinkers as;ree that there is some thine:
to mind that is not yet within reach of the analyst.
3. On the lower levels meaning is satisfactorily explained
on a pure sensation basis; but it becomes increasingly dif-
ficult as one ascends the scale.
4. At present it seems to be the best "re can do to carry
analysis as far as possible and then assume consciousness of
a particular sort--the consciousness of relations, which we
cannot derive from sensory data. I'cDougall and Spearman
and some others assume a principle of co<^nition which is,
of course little more than furnishinn: a specification of
consciousness itself. This saves from the mechanism of the
Behaviorist ani from, the sensation-association formulas which
m.ay describe but never explain.
5. It must be remembered that consciousness itself is an
emers^ent which appears when there are no adjustive responses
ready in the ort^anism.
6. The Gestalt theory is a o-reat help toward an understand-
ing of the dawn ond emerc;ence of meaning. Situations, not
units, are seen as the important elements of experience.
7. The subconscious is a storehouse upon which the mind
draws, and into which matters r;hich were once in the mind sink,
8. Reflection is man's noblest effort to control his en-
vironment. To reflect is to query a stimulus.
9. Reflection is in part suided by attitude over which man
has o-reat control.
i
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CHAFTER VI.
VOLITION.
Wli^t^ is Gienerally called will, v/hether it be affirmed or
denied by theory, as a recofl;nized fact in human society. The
world's affairs are conducted on the basis of the assumption
that man achieves some measure of conscious control. Hence
if he acts as society thinks he should he is commended, if not
he is sent to jail or to the electric chair. Behavioristic
psychology takes little notice of anythine; called will or vol-
ition, and rives no explanation at all why the character of a
c-ood man is often r'^^ciulated bv the prompting of his weaker
desires, "/illiam Tames puts this idea in a strikin"-ly simple
diae;ramnat ic form, thus:
Ideal, per se. Native propensity.
Ideal plus will Native propensity. (1)
(effort)
Yrhat then is this determinini?; aspect of character? Is it a
transcendent and spiritual somethinrr, a pure delusion, or
somethin-' entirely different from either?
V/e can divide our acts into two classes: voluntary and
involuntary. The latter is reflex or instinctive, an adaptive
act of the orG;anism, althou.'^h it must be admitted that even
here there is always an indirect strivine- toward some end. A
typical voluntary act is preceded by the imagination of some
chane-e in the existing situation; in a sense it is an inter-
vention between the reflex-Instinctive and the habitual.
According to James, and the conclusion seems ten^tble : "Voluntary
(2)
movements must be secondary, not primary functions of our orrranism."
(1) "/m. James Principles of Psychology p 549.
(2) " " " " " ' p 487.
f
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Bistinctly voluntary acts sprin'^ from a choice: a hesitancy
between two tendencies. After the end is chosen the volition
is complete. The classic example is Buridan's ass starvinp- to
death between two shocks of hay since he could not decide which
should constitute his dinner.
Can v;e find a phys iolce:ical basis for volition? The
psycho-analytic school would hot hesitate to make the pro-
nouncement that all of our actions and conations crain their
enery from instinctive sources; the instincts at work result
A''
in the com.plexes, which in turn control the further working
(1)
of the instincts and the ',7hole life of the mind. ^'cDouejall
would agree that the instincts form the ^-roundwork of the mental
(2)
structure of the mind. Meumann, the German investigator,
finds a physical basis for the will act and asserts that weak
(3)
nervous constitutions are accompanied by weak volitional activity.
No doubt there is a definite relation existing between healthy
physiological function and volitional activity but at the same
time it seems to be an unwarranted step to find the full ex-
plahation in the workins;s of the organism. The drainace theory
(4)
propounded by James and others seeks to furnish an explanation:
Each person is controlled by a number of interest systems which
are the result of his experience; v/hen an impulse arises in
the mind the widest and deepest system drains the impulse throuc-h
its (the system's) accustomed channels, hence the favored system
controls the situation, ^^ut why? Does a free psychic agent
emer^ine; from the soul or mind determine the favored system?
(1) A. C. Tansley The New ^sycholos-y pp 34-5, 192, 287.
(2) ",'m. McDourrali Social Psycholop-y 15th. ed. p 22
.
(3) See Roback Psycholop-y of Character p 221.
(4) Vm. James Principles of Psychology p 584-5.
r
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The only ansv/er nust be sneculative and that can have no nlace
here; it ".vould brln^r up the v/hole body-mind problem with its
manifold philosophical and metaphysical distinctions and impli-
cations. Suffice it to say that there is no rrood reason for
denyinp: the interaction of the two; ther>e is less reason for
allowing body to affect mind and refusing; to t^irant the mind
power to affect the hodj. The simplest occurences of life im-
ply interaction. All theories that would seek to provide a
parallelism of mind and body are too far-fetched to be useful
or significant. The laws of sequence and concomitant variation
7/ill not furnish our needed solution.
Alexander Shand definitely relates v/illina; to the emotions
and sentiments, v/hich he regards as the foundations of character.
He says: "it may easily be ure-ed that the will is not an in-
dependent force--at least, in the bepiinninp-, or before it dev-
elops the power of real choice; that it is an expression of the
tendencies of the emotions and sentiments; that in them its
innate qualities are manifested, and its acquired qualities
(1)
developed." He declares further that the strene^th or weak-
ness of will varies with the strenf^th or weakness of the emo-
tion behind it, but at the same time he agrees that there are
also innate differences--the backlying something which is still
more or less of a mystery to psychologists who insist on rec-
(2)
ognizing all the facts.
Though the element of mystery still remains, scientific
inquiry is by no means rendered unproductive, but is rather
under the obligation to be more painstaking and thoroughfroincr
(1) Alex. Shand The Foundations of Personality p65.
(2) Same p67
.
(
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than ever. Hypothetical explanations cannot be countenanced
until science has exhausted itself in its search for facts
and their relations. Since volition cannot be accounted for
on a purely physiological basis we can assume for further in-
vestigation that it is an aspect of mind j by this it is not
meant that it is a faculty or force as such . McDouc^all says
that will is "the workinc: of the conative impulses that sprinr^
from the instinctive dispositions, impulses workincr, not soorad-
ically and in detachment from one another, but within a deli-
cately balanced and more or less harmoniously unitary system."
(2)
Wiss Calkins calls it an "assertive consciousness." Tf we
recoe^nize a scale of conations runnins: from the lowest to the
hifthest 7/e mi<7ht consider will as a specially complex case of
conation havincr its foundations in innate disposition or in-
stinct, or in some acquired instinct or both. At any rate will
is high in the scale. Volitional action is deliberative action
involvinp; the entire ps7;-cho-physical process, "it is clear
that in the volitional act the whole of consciousness is brought
together and focused on the solution of an adjustment problem]
and all of the sub-processes of interpretation and appreciation
are 7/oven together as strands into the complicated process
(3)
which v/e call volition." The feelinf side does enter into
volition; the factor of value, Dresent or future, is also an
important component. Miss Calkins declares that alon? with
the sensational factors will includes a consciousness of
(4)
(1) futurity, (2) connectedness, and (3) realness. "'ill,
(1) Wm. vcDougall Outline of Psychology p 447.
(2) i^lary ''/. Calkins First Book in Psycholoe:y p 228.
(3) Jos. Coffin Personality in the Makin<T td 121.
(4) Same as (2) p 231,
ci
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then, has no structural element li?^e emotion or sensation;
hence we can say very little about its neural conditions.
"Volition, or will, is not the simple power it is popularly
supposed to be, but an exceedingly complex response involving
(1)
the whole mental orc!;anizat ion."
Since will involves the entire psycho-physical process,
and this process is the result of experience, (usinr the term
in its broadest sense) it would follow lop;lcally that will is
one of the developments of the or<7anization of experience in
the life of the individual. A volitional act is an act of
balancinrr- ideas and decidine; between them, the ideas cominc?;
from past experience; it is consciousness under the specifi-
cation of choice of meanine:s or ^lues with reference to the
self. 'Vhat is a purpose but imagining oneself in a better
condition or situation than the present one? ilence, "the choice
c
which an individual makes to-day has its roots in the exnerlenes
of yesterday and of the earlier education before yesterday."
Speakincr of habit John Dewey says that its essence is not
predisposition to particular acts but to modes of response;
(3)
it means will. This seems to be a little far-fetched as
does the statement of H. '^-oddard that, "volitional action
or will is a matter of neurone Datterns, which 'n turn is a
(4)
matter of inheritance plus experience." ^illsbury has some-
what the same idea but his puttinT of the proposition is more
acceptable since he does not dogmatically reduce volition to
the physiological. "When the will acts, it acts in the lis-ht
{1)F. L. Strickland ^^sycholosry of Relio-ious Experience p 29.
(2) Chas. Tudd Psychology p S06
.
(3) john Dewey Human ^Tature and Conduct p 42.
(4)Quoted by Valentine Psychology of Personality p 194.
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of the motives j it is an expression of the nature of the Tian;
and that in turn is dependent uoon his instincts and training,
(1)
his immediate purposes and his p;eneral ideals." Tn other
words Pillshury leaves the "nay open for other than physical
factors. It is safer to couple purposes and ideals with the
instincts and training because the former are facts of life
just as clearly as are the latter. Fvid©ntl-n- we have a basis
of meanins; consciousness upon which control throua;h conscious-
ness (volition) is "built. The emergence from non-voluntary
reactions to those called voluntary is gradual and depends
u^ the degree of consciousness preceding the action.
If volition is largely a matter of experience can there
be such a thing as free will? Certainly the extreme liber-
tarian position is untenable; but determinism as a conclusion
in not a whit more logical. This question is not as vital
to-day as it once was; modern psychology tends to obviate it
altogether. Som.e, as we have shown, believe that a person can
consciously direct his orsranism, but his caDability alons
that line is limited by his experience. This cannot be proven
while on the other hand there is evidence to indicate that the
mind has real creative activity or ability. 'Vhile volition is
an active correlate of organized experience it is not necessar
ily determined thereby. A person is aware of the fact that he
can do one of two or more thincs in a situation; the student
can drive himself to study in the eveninn: or take himself to
a play; past experience may of course influence his decision,
but he knows that he can e-o contrary to past experiences if
he so chooses. As was stated in the opening page of the
(1) B. Pillsbury Fundamentals of Psychology p 53.'5-4.
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chapter the v/orld is run on the basis of hutian resnons ibility
for acts committed, and this is usually taken to mean some
measure of freedom of v;ill. Hence for modern thou'^'ht the
problem is one of ethics more than of science; psycholoo;ically
it is outcrrO'Vn rather than solved.
Does volition have an essential mark or characteristic
factor? (^-ranted that it is larprely a matter of habit systems
and that it m.ust operate throue-h the laws of the mind, and
that it has no structural element, what is there about it
that causes us to recognize its existence? James said that:
"Volition is a psychic or noral fact pure and simple, and is
absol\itely completed when the stable state of the idea is there.
'Vill's f?reat achievement is to hold an object before the mind
(1)"
and attend to it. This is it's fiat." A more recent writer
says: "What is com^ionly known as will is simply another name
for the power and momentum, of a man's personal self. 'Vill
exists not as a thin? but as a process, "'ill is the whole
complex organization of the Dermanent self set over ap-ainst
(2)
an alien intruding impulse," Judd agrees substantially with
the foresoins;: "Voluntary choice is the fullest expression of
the developed normal self. 7hen a man chooses, he expresses
his personality. This is the essential fact about volition;
choice is not an arbitrary sudien mode of thous'ht or action;
it is, rather, the consummate expresGion of all that has en-
tered into individual life." Dewey calls will the "personal
(4)
aspect of causation," and Pillsbury designates it as the "Whole
(5)
man active." Jastrov/ asserts that the quality of will is the
(1) '7m. James Principles of Psycholos:y p 560-1,
(2) Irwin Fdman Human ""raits d 153.
(3) C. H. Judd ^sycholocry p 307.
(4) John "Dewey Human TTature and Conduct p 44.
(5) 'V. ^. "^illsbury Fundamentals of Psychology p 534.
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conbined resolution and restraint that remains dominant in
connection with the support of intellectually and emotionally
(1)
guided conduct.
What is it then that prompts a man to do as he does
especially if his acts are v<orthy of commendation? As one
follows the reasoning of different wrriters a few of whom^ have
lust been quoted the same note sounds a^ain and acain, like
the haunt inp- Dhrase runninc through a symphony: the whole man,
the self, his personality/, etc. A person does choose the diff-
icult when the easy thino: could be chosen. Two persons may
face the same possible choices; they will choose differently.
Why? Native differences and strength of emotional reaction
no doubt affect the choiee, but few there are who will assert
that they determine it entirely, '"ill has some sort of deep
root that has not as yet been discovered; but that drives us no
warrant to regard it as some ethereal essence. In an act of
will the be^innins: is m.arked by some idea or aim, and the end
with execution. In the orocess a mental act called decision
(2)
emerges. In this connection Strickland says: Here we must
reckon with purpose, the characteristic factor in a true vol-
ition—the element in our experience which cannot be explained
(3)
by the usual synthesis of neural factors." It is a fact of
common experience that one can by effort of will retain in the
mind an idea that otherwise would be crowded out. In deliber-
ation two ideas are held before the mind until one is chosen
as a course of action; i^ resolution one idea is held before
(1) J, Tastrow Character and Temperament p 246.
(2) See Valentine Fsycholos-y of Personality p 186-7,
(3) F. T. Strickland ?sy. of Reli^-ious Fxp. p 37.
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the mind until some definite action is taken toward it; in
recalling a forn:otten name the person is held before the mind
until the name comes. The whole self enters into these od-
erations and where decision must be made the personality is
often thrown on the side of the orie^inally weaker motive.
It was James' opinion that the will performed an inhibitive
function, drivlns out all other ideas so that the favored one
(1)
could persist of its own enerf^y, but this leaves us stranded
aoiain since we do not know how the will inhibits. Tt seems to
be more true to the facts to think of the will as reinforcinpr
the dominant idea; thus it would operate in somewhat the same
fashion as desire.
Is it possible to educate the will? It would appear that
we must answer in the neerative since ?/e cannot rret at the seat
of the 7/ill in any definite manner. Yet we do not know just
what electricity is but v;e can control it and make of it an
obedient servant. The race mi?ht well be thankful that a know-
ledge of ultimates is not necessary to Drof^ress. '^'^cDouf^all
(2)
calls the will "character in action." When one admits that
man has any control whatever over his actions he at the same
time admits the possibility of an educated will. John Stuart
(3)
Mill said that "a character is a completely fashioned will."
The will is the fiber or stamina that )?ives character to man.
"As far as the individual is concerned orrranizat ion of conduct
(4)
can come only throu^rh intellif?ent volition." '''ill is a
(1) T,m, James Principles of Psycholofry p 525.
(2) ":m ?;^cDouc?all Outline of Psycholorry p I-B442-3.
(3) Quoted by Valentine ^sy. of Pers. p 184.
(4) J. H. Coffin Personality in the Making p 121.
(1
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trall-lDlazer . vlss Calkins pictures it as an autocratic
dictator: ""''ill is a consciousness of my active connection with
other selves or with thino;s, an es;oistic. Imperious, relation,
(1)
a domineering- mood, a sort of bullyino- attitude." Jastrow
connects the will with energy: "Possibly the larf^est differ-
ence among men, speakins: pragmatically, is this of enercy
(2)
and its emotional counterpart, courage." The will supplies
effective stimuli vihen the natural ones fade.
If we could picture will p-oino- into action we would
see a process involving four steos : (1) First of all there
would be the need of a definite purpose or aim, possibly an
ideal to be achieved; (2) There would be the need of some abil-
ity to see the future, the end from the beginning, including
some idea of the road that must be traveled; (5) Decisions
must be made, perhaps a clash of wills will take place;
(4) Strono" morale must be ever present, this would be a prod-
uct of experience em.bracinn- those outcomes which we have learned
to be the best, and outlinin^^ for us the pe^^thway which,
in the long run, will lead to the desired destination,
(1) Mary Calkins First Book in Psycholorry p 226.
(2) Jos. Jastrow Character and ''emp erament p 299.
m
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CHAPTFR VTI.
TEMPERAMEM"
.
The question of temperament is as elusive as it is
interesting-. Jastrov* calls it a composite inherent bent of
nature and sa77s further: "Temperament is nature specialized
upon the bais of a temper of qualities of a common inheritance,
(1)
expressed in and throu2;h the functioning; of the nervous system."
It is a sort of biological essence of original nature and has
definite relation to the great psychological complexes. It is
commonly confused with character or else it is thoue-ht of as
beiner with the individual from the beginning v/hile character is
a later development, a result of the erowinr? and learning pro-
cess, le could think of temperament as being innate character,
the mode in which a man is affected by the different stimuli
of daily life, "^e mis'ht call it the sum. of the innate tem.pers
of his different emotions, Emerson has represented temperam.ent
as an inner destiny against which it is vain to contend. This
is no doubt an extreme putting of the idea but '.'liss Hinkle would
support it to the extent of saying that the basic tvpes are
(2)
born, not made, "^hile the influence of heredity is apparent,
there is reason to believe that training may have a transforming
influence. If we must define temperament we might say that it
is the predominant manner in which a person reacts to his en-
vironment; it is expressed in sensibilities, primary emotions,
and response to situations--particularly primitive situations.
It is inseparable from character although the former is probably
(1) Jos. .Tastrow Character and Temperam.ent p 248.
(2) Beatrice H, Hinkle The Re-Creatinf? of the Individual
p 267.
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the more fundamental --the foundation upon which the super-
structure is erected.
The ohys ioloeical backTround of temperament is to be
found in the nervous system. Two important factors seem, to
be involved: (1) Functional peculiarities of the nervous tissue
and (2) Influences exerted on the nervous system. Concerning
the latter Miss Hinkle has tvio thought -provoking thint^s to say:
"in the primary shock of birth mi^ht be found an important fac-
tor beariner upon the f?-reat distinction betvreen the two major
divisions of extravert and introvert." She thinks the intro-
vert would experience the more profound shock. Quoting? further:
"One individual would be more sensitive to the effect of sen-
sations comins- from without, and another more affected by the
(1)
self -s-enerated impulses arisinpr within the ore;anism itself."
Strickland in a recent article sives us an excellent summary
of the physiological backG;round of temperament: "Temperament-
al differences ani capacities depend upon certain conditions
in the physical organism, such as rate and strenrrth of heart-
beat, speed of nerve current throu?"h the nerve fibers, end also
upon the relative activity of certain internal glands v/hich
pour their secretions into the blood stream. Traits, by
which we mean characteristic ways of reacting, may be either
inherited or acquired, thouf^h the conditions for the favor-
able development of abilities are determined by bodily struc-
ture and the quality of the nervous system and hence are mat-
(2)
ters of physical inheritance." It would seem from this that
(1) E. M. Hinkle The Re-Oreating of the Individual pp 269-71.
(2) F. L. Strickland Determ.ining Temperament
Zion's Herald Feb. 1, 1928.
(i
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temperament is more or less fixed and it is; throu'Thout life
a man will be biased but not necessarily controlled by it.
By deliberate choice a person may remodel his temperament
and make of himself a new creature*
These considerations raise the question as to whether
or not there exist certain fundamental tynes --basic nreform-
ations of character, '"-alen as far back as 150 A, D. divided
and placed the race in four diffe'^ent comnartments , and most
remarkably had a chemico-phys iolop:ical basis for his findinr's.
His classification follows:
1. Sanguine warm-blooded friendly uncle type,
2. Choleric yellovir bile Cassius-lean and hunE;ry.
3. ?hlee:matic slu^rish bile plodder and follower.
4. Melancholic black bile hypochondriac.
It can be said for this ancient classification that it resem-
bles present conceptions reeardinp- the influence of the duct-
less 2;lands . But of course they are determined by a combin-
ation of conditions rather than by any sin/:^le factor. The
traditional method of classifyins: the temperaments usually
proceeded on the basis of three fundamental propositions:
(1) characteristics of external appearance, (2) qualities of
character sometimes found to co-exist, and (3) predominance
of some bodily ora;an or system to account for the coexistins;
characteristics. Tiowivould n man be classified under the above
system if he lacked the qualification of some extreme trait?
The lack of an answer to this question leads to the conclusion
that any such system is inadequate for the followine^ reasons:
(1) The assumption that if a quality is in one or even in a
majority of cases of mental processes it is in all is untenable,
(2) the types are based upon conceptions of quantities that
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are indefiriable in amount, (3) the whole table is thus exac;-
eerated and artificial, and (4) inferences are drawn only frorc
the visible and cannot be exact. The temper of one emotion
cannot be assumed to attach itself to other emotions in the
same person. In this same connection Gordon says: "it was im-
possible to demonstrate any facts to support the inference
that these types had anythinp- to do with the special variations
.
' (1)
in the liquid constituents of the body."
Considering?; the modern classifications we have an int-
erestlnc one from James; he has two main divisions with eierht
(2)
subdivisions under each as follows:
Tender-m.inded Toue:h-minded
Rationalist ic ( cuided by principles) Empirical ( f^uided by facts.)
Intellectual Sensational
Idealistic Materialistic
Optimistic Pessimistic
Relipiious IrreliE!;ious
Free Willist Fatalist
Monistic Pluralistic
Dogmatic Skeptical
Jung's classification is very susrrestive and not without
(3)
much practical value:
Extravert-Fensat ional extravaf^ant in emotion.
Introvert-Sensational ^^ourns or re loices by himself.
Extravert-Tntuitional ecstatic.
Introvert-Intuitional vis ionary--new inspirations.
Extravert -Fee ling may make fool of himself.
Introvert -Feelinft less tolerant of fools.
Fxtravert-Thinking man of affairs.
Introvert -Thinkins" hish desree of inspiration.
The sensation and feeling types seem to overlap cons iderabl:/
and the intuitional types lack the stamp of practicality.
Jastrow distinguishes four types, usin-^ the same term-
(1) R. Gordon Personality p 53.
(2) "filliam Jam.es "ras-matism p 12.
(3) C. ^T, Jung Psychological Types Chapter X.
#9
-97-
irxoloejy for each, the difference beinr found only In e^nphasis.
The cap5.tal letters Indicate the preponderance of the partic-
ular phase emphasized:
sensitive -ACTIVE type SanG:ulne(?) practical executive.
SENSITIVE -active type l^Telancholic ( ? ) reflective -deliberate
SENSITIVE-ACTIVE type Choleric(?) energetic,
sensitive-active type Phlej5:matic ( ? ) easy-soin^.
(1)
A classification of this sort tends to emphasize the obvious
fact that temperamental differences are not so much a matter
of equipment, but of the manner in which equipment is used.
Kretschmer finds the basis of the temperaments in two
main interacting^ s^^stems ; (1) the psychic apparatus --sense
-
bi^n-m.otor equipment, and (2) the chemistry of the blood and
the humors of the body. The latter influences (a) psychomo-
tility, the movement tempo; (b) psychoaesthes ia , a technical
term for sensitivity or insens it ivity to psychic stimulations;
(c) mood-colorinp, the pleasure or unpleasure tone of the
physique content j and (d) psychic-tempo, the acceleration and
retardation of psychic processes in general. He in common with
other psychologists recognizes two main groups of temperaments,
groups with awe-insprins names:
Cyclothymes Schizothymes
Poets
Experimenters
Leaders
Realists
Humanists
Observers
Describers
Empiricists
Tough whole -hogrrers
Jolly Organizers
Understanding Concil- Cold Calculators
iators
Pathetics
Romantics
For^*? lists
Exact LOf?lcians
bystemat ists
Me taphy s i c ians
Pure Idealists
Despots and Fanatics
(1) Jos. Jastrow Character and Temperament pp 255-6.
(2) E. Kretschmer Physique and Character pp 251-262.
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Kretschner also asserts in his technical wa:^ that the direct
action of the brain can cause noticeable modifications of tem-
perament. This significant idea saves one from beins^ dominated
by a one-sided view of the secretions and their power.
Abraham Myerson, the author of a work which is more
popular than scientific in its appeal, uses energy and emotion
as his basis of division. One questions his reliability be-
cause his emphasis is so completely physiological. He recog-
nizes a half-dozen varieties under each of two main types:
(1)
the kinetic and the emotional.
These various tabulations reveal diversity of opinion
but also reveal more striking points of general ao-reement.
First of the the connection between bodily and mental states
seems to be accepted without question. A man'? behavior is
very clearly dependent to a larre extent upon the orgi^anizat ion
of his bodily functions. (T.fverson would make this an absolute
(2)
rule; man for him. is an engine.) Disease and injury alter
every activity of the body and mind. The departure of person-
ality from the normal depends upon abnormalities of growth,
whether bodily or mental. The how and the why of all this has
been in the dark until recently; all is not yet revealed but
there has come enough light to enable one to say that the
darkness no longer reigns supreme. The uorld war has brought to
light certain facts in this connection by furnishinrr an un-
limited number of expeffJLment cases over a wide ranp-e of
physical and mental disorder. It has been demonstrated that
(1) Abraham '.^yerson Foundations of Personality Chapter XVTI.
(2) Same P 22.
i9
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certain elands have ^uch to do with what a person shall make
of himself physically, mentally, and spiritually. Herman's
work on the "Glands Regulatinc; Personality" is somewhat too
enthusiastic but some interest ins; facts are to be ^^ound there.
He claims to be on the track of findinr"" the formula of the
(1)
soul, reminding one of the search for the philosopher's stone
and the fountain of perpetual youth. He fails to recognize
that there may be a component part of that formula that cannot
be found--at least where he is lookino- for it. The following
table is designed to p:ive in the briefest possible way his
idea of the elands and their functions:
Name of Gland
Thyroid
Pituitary anterior
Pituitary posterior
Adrenals
Cortex
Medulla
Pineal
Thymus
Interstitial
Parathyroids
Secretion
Thyroxin
TJnknov/n
Pituitrin
Unknown
Adrenalin
Unknown
Unlmown
Unknown
Unknovm
^unction
Fnev^y production
'^-rowth of skeleton
^nerg7;- consumction
Glands of combat
Brain Growth
'Energy for emergency
Brain and sex
Gland of childhood
Secondary sex traits
Controllers of lime
(metabolism. Excitability
(of muscle and nerve.
Controller of sugar
metabolism.
(2)
The thyroid gland is the controller of the speed of living;
it played an important part in makinrr land animrls of sea
animals j in man it maintains the amount of iofline as in his
natural habitat, the sea. Cretinism results from thyroid
deficiency, while feeding thyroxin brings about a transformation:
a complete remaking of boiy and mind; it m.akes a froo- from, a
Pancreas Insulin
(1) Louis Berman The '^-lands Regulatinp- Personality p 22.
(2) Same pp 94-5.
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tadpole and a person fron an impregnated cell. Concerning the
pituitary he declares that the complete extirpation of the eland
means death, while partial extirpation means defeneration.
Sleep and hibernation are results of the temporary dormancy
of this gland j overaction in a child means a friant.
While it is understood that the enthusiasts on the sub-
ject tend to ffo to extremes it seem quite clear that the se-
cretions mentioned affect neural functions and hence behavior.
At the same time it is evidently the case that many state-
ments concerning the secretions are a-priori probabilities
rather than empirically proven facts. Dr. Berman does not
have the medical profession solidly behind him in his assertions.
The e-lands work together. When one is singled out and studied
it is by no means certain that the observer is not ignoring
some vitally important factor. A, person's habits are made by
his experience, not by his glands, although it is freely
admitted that the r lands affect his experience. It is possible
that the t lands are united in a sort of inte rlockinc: direct-
orate, the balance of power being held by the strongest,
Tny is any particular one strongest in a f?-iven situation?
'Ve can say that original nature made it so or v^e can say that
we do not know, or V7e can believe in some psychic factor not
yet tangible to the observer- -perhaps the missing part of
Berman' s formula for the soul.. The operation of the erlands
varies nerve tension; this is manifested in emotional feelinr,
but T;hy the eland begins to operate in its particular manner
we do not know.
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This summary of a study of the facts, foundations,
and classifications of temperaments has been made with the
end in view of arriving at a decision as to whether or not
people can be grouped in any sort of practical and usable
manner. As a final aid recourse has been made to a very
simple experij^ment : the listins of the names of a hundred
relatives, friends, and acquaintances in all walks of life,
with a mental review of the traits, activities, similarities,
and differences of each alone and in comoarison with others.
The vYhole s'roup fell quite readily into two main divisions:
Jung's labels, extravert and introvert seem to be the more
applicable des irrnations j almost as readily the p:roup fell
into another classification, dominated by feelings, or by
intellect. Combining the two croups the foll^iifin?^ results
were obtained:
1. Ext rave rt -emo t i ona
1
33
2. Introvert -emotional 24
«^ « Extravert -intellectual 21
4. Introvert -intellectual 20
5. Unclass if iable 2
The surprisin-"' element of the result was the way in which
the PTOups were so evenly divided. Perhaps life on the earth
would be unbearable or even unliveable were not its inhabitants
balanced accordinc? to some such system. There ma.y be more
truth than nonsense in the popular saying: "it takes all kinds
to make a world." It v;ould not have been a difficult matter
to divide the f^roup accordinfr to activity something after the
order of Myerson's kinetic types. An attempt was also made
to classify the individuals according to some phase of
11
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volitional activity but this did not v/ork out v/ith any dearee
of satisfaction. The conclusion was finally arrived at that
each member of each rrroup was shot throun;h with a dep-ree of
volitional activity peculiar to himself. It was feared that
the practicality of any classification would decrease as its
subdivisions increased, hence the stop was made at four.
The only final stopping place would be reached when each per-
son had found his own particular o-roup, wherein he would be so
labeled as to be set anart from all the rest of humanity.
It is helpful to remember here that conversrence is more com-
mon and more important for the progress of the race than
di.i^ression. If individuals did not have a ?rreater number of
similarities than they have differences, the science of
psychology would be impossible j schools, colleges, and all
group teachings and activities would be out of the question.
Temperament is not merely a characteristic of an indiv-
idual; it v/ould be more in accord with the truth to say that
it is the individual. Each man is different, not because his
gross structure is so unlike that of his fellows, but because
of other and more elusive factors. This problem of individ-
ual differences is the one \7hich makes classification so
difficult. Recent thoup-ht has had a decided materialistic
bias; the tendency has been to reduce everythinP" to that which
can be appreciated by the senses, but this view is untenable
for lon?r because it is so incomplete and limited to say nothing
of its beinp: scientifically dishonest since it ignores facts
that are onl:/ explained away by some ipse dixit. Luther micht
have recanted as did rralileo, but he didn't. '7hy didn't he?
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"'as it because of his glands, or because of some power that he
had that enabled him to dictate to his prlands? Tny is^nore that,
which we cannot isolate and name? From the primary colors an
artist can mix shades and tones by the thousands. The normal
individual has the primary colors and the power to mix blends
and combinations that set him off from his fellow-men; the
social forces about him helo, of course, with the m.ixinp"
process since they furnish the stimulus for the ore-anic habits
which become a part of temperament. The vigor of Physiolog-
ical function and psychological tone will partly explain the
process. Thorndike lists three causes of individual differences
(1) Original nature: sex, ancestry, and environment, (2) Ex-
tent to which original tendencies have been matured by mere
(1)
inner s-rowth, and (3) circumstances of life and training.
It can be demonstrated without difficulty that types
generically the same can be changed by emphasis upon the
intellectual or emotional phases. One of Jastrow's SENSITIVE-
active people might be melancholic under an intellectual
emphasis or aesthetic under an emotional emphasis. The rule
is, however, that each individual has a temperamental set.
Furthermore, Valentine makes the assertion that as personality
develops one becomes less and less susceptible to the irrelevant
factors in a situation and so moves toward a aider constancy
(2)
within the scope of any temperamental trait. The reason
for this is, no doubt, that habits are organized in systems
and attention is controlled b:;- narrowine: interests. 'le adds
(1) .tuoted by Valentine in Psychology of Personality p 54.
(2) P. F. Valentine n ' » " ' p 21-22
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also that the efficiency of metabolism, and disposition of
bodily by-products are important factors to be considered
since a smooth runnlncr mechanism fosters a brisrht hedonic
tone. Yiiss Hazlitt ao;rees substantially with this; in her
book on Ability she brines out the fact that however one uses
his orie;inal endowment it will lead to the development of
special abilities. Canacity is e-eneral, accordinrr to her
(1)
conception, while abilities are special.
Most individuals have a characteristic level of
emotion, thinkin??;, willing, etc., particularly the first.
In each emotional level there appear three dimensions:
(1) frequency and chanere, (2) breadth, and (3) strene;th.
a
It is here that we find a bsis for that v/hlch is called
A
rellrious experience, a ohase of psycholof^y which is in
itself a special and Interestincr field of investigation.
(The balance of the chapter will be devoted to this subject,
because religion orovides an admirable opportunity for the
study of temperament in an objective way, and because religion
is one of the p-reat dominatln<T forces of life.) Man does
not have a religious nature as such; the various interests
which he pursues: business, art, sclemce, politics, relia-ion,
all and each occupy the whole man. To a normal man some
sort of rell,rrious outlook is es;:ential; some sort of philos-
ophy of life is necessary if he would rise above the brute
plane of existence. It is strann;e that so many psychologists
pride them.selves upon isrnorine' this; while boastinp: of their
(1) Victoria "azlltt Ability p 74.
•
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empirical honesty they refuse to recof^nlze some of the out-
standinp; facts of human experience.
Conscious direction of the orp-anism seems to be just as
evident a fact as the phys iolOf?;ical foundation for mind. If
conscious direction is possible, then temperament is modifiable.
Nature can be modified bv nurture, and the process becrins at
(1)
birth. "The personal environment is therefore a very powerful
factor in the education of children. The habitual emotional
attitudes of the people who surround a little child leave their
(2)
impress upon him before he is three years old," This simply
means that his temperamental bias has received a 'set* at this
early stage in his experience, and this 'set' is traceable to
forces outside himself.
Some, no ioubt, are better equipped than others for
special forms of the reli.Q;ious experience, but v/ho vrill say
that the experience of the m.7rstic is of finer quality than
the experience of the m.an driven to ohilantbropic activity
and social service by the sheer love of his fellow-men?
There is room for each type and fortunate is the man who works
for and attains a balance within himself; he can do this and
yet retain his temperamental set: be pred^ominant ly an extra-
vert or an introvert and yet enough of both to appreciate the
viewpoint of another individual. Let us assert once more the
fact that pure types do not exist among normal people.
'Villiam James was not dealing with normal people when he said
that relirrious geniuses show symptoms of nervous instability,
(1) There is some re'json to believe that the process sometimes
if not alv/a^fs antedates birth.
(2) F, L. Strickland Determining? 'temperament
Zion's Herald Feb. 1, 1928.

and that the oatholoffical features of their exnerience ftive
power and authority to them. An experiment conducted by
Professor Coe at Northwestern T''nivers'lty some years ap-o is
of interest here. A frroup of students were divided into several
smaller groups, one of which was composed of those who expected
some sort of radical transformation as an indication or accom-
paniment of their religious experience. Some of the ^roup
received that which they expected, and others did not. All
were classified as to their predomAnant characteristic:
(2)
intellect, sensibility, or will, with the followine* result:
Sensibility Intellect '"ill
predominant predominant oredominant
17 Y/ho expected
transformation 12 2 3
and received it.
12 who expected
transformation 2 9 1
and did not receive
(it.
This is by no means conclusive evidence but it is an indication
that those v/ho live by the senses are more likely to 3;et that
sort of experience than those whose lives are ruled by intel-
lect. This does not prove that the sense-dominant people
have more aptitude for relicrious experience than the intellect
or will-dominant type, rlach class will merely tend to ^et a
different type of experience.
ADplyinrr the system of classification which we have
(?)
chosen as usable and nvactical to relip-ious experience we
would p-et some sirch result as the f ollov/inp;
.
(1) Tm. Jam.es Varieties of Peli^ious Experience p 25.
(2) Geo. A. Coe The Spiritual Life op 109-120.
(3) See Page 101.
0t
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p]xt rave rt-emot ional : --the type frequently encoimtered
in campmeetinRS where the 'old-fashioned' sonpel is e^nphasized
.
The standard of Christian experience is the manifestation of
the power of the spirit, such as cifts of tonp^ues, physical
exertions, etc. In a far western state, a few y/ears ac-o, the
writer v;as acquainted v^ith a preacher who v;as an excellent
example of this type. :Ie was a larr^e man (260 pounds), had
an imposing" appearance , oersonal mafrnetism, and was almost
worshipped by a coranany of 400 neople whom he had e-athered ahout
him. It would usually take him ahout fiftenn minutes to Piet
his congregation to the nlace where he could make them laugh,
cry, shout, or groan, whichever micrht be his desire (he would
say the 'leadinrr of the spirit'). He accomplished this by
certain peculiar modulations of voice accompanied by a rhyth-
mic swayin?r of his srreat body, and rapidly change nc facial ex-
pressions. He could feel the pulse of his crowd and knew what
would bring response at a particular point in the service, '-^'he
sermons were appeals to the emotions and their effectiveness
was judged by the feelin?: aroused. The same conditions pre-
vailed in the weekly prayer-meet inn- and the frequent revival
services. An emotional experience was regarded as real, or
rather no experience was considered complete until the seeker
had found liberty to lump, shout, or exhort.
Introvert-emotional: — the tyne that is subject to deep
feeling, noticeable only to the observint?; such may even shun
the noise of the group just portrayed, have visions, dream
dream.E, have revelations direct from God, and possibly be
afflicted by spiritual pride, or an excess of humility.
f
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In the same church there was an example of this type, a
Mr. B . He was an elderly etentleman who preferred re-
liniious services where anyone with a ^messawe* miffht have
opportunity of delivering it. He was never noisy, yet was
ree^arded wit'i s:reat veneration since he had trances where he
saw thiners which sounded very profound and significant with the
tellins; of them. Scripture verses for him always had some
deep neanino:, he would expound them for an hour without his
hearers be ins able to understand a thing. Instead of ree;ard-
ine: him as visionary and incoherent their respect for him was
usually increased. These stran'^e experiences v/ould cone to
him when he was alone, hence it was not just for show. He
was, of course, an extreme case. The late Bishop Quayle of
the r.'ethodist Church might be cited as an example of the
hifrhest type of this class, althoun-h some mintht argue with
e;ood reason that he should be classified with the introvert-
intellectual group.
Extravert-intellectual : --the oreranizers ond builders.
They may decry the emotional element to the extent of re-
ducing; reli.crion too much to 8 business proposition. Bishops,
college presidents, and men of affairs are frequently good
examples of this croup.
Introvert-intellectual : --the theologi/ans and philosopher
'^-reat preachers and intelligent Txystics will be found in this
group j some may have a tendency to become too ritualistic. In
the church v/e have mentioned there was a certain young man
who was repeatedly urged to come forward for prayers j
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conscientiously he. went and became the center of a rreat
hubbub as the faithful P-athered around to "nray him throu(3;h."
Time and ap-ain he -.vent through this same performance tryino;
hard to obey all instructions but becominp- more and more
confused all the time. One day he packed a knapsack, v/ent
off into the mountains for three days, then returned with the
look of a man who had settled soTie bafflin?^ problem. Out in
the quietude of nature he literally 'fip;ured it out' for
himself. He t7/pifies this ci;roup, and has since become an
inspirational preacher of considerable power.
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STT?.r ARY
1. Temperament may be considered as the foundation uDon v/hich
character may be built.
2. Temperament has a stronc' physical and hereditary basis.
3. There is in it also a psychic element that cannot be
ignored
.
4. Classifications must not be taken too seriously. There
are no pure types amonr: normal persons. People cannot be
labeled and penned in stoc"k7;ard fashion.
5. Yet we can in a general way group people according to thei
predominant characteristics.
6. The extrovert-introvert and emotional-intellectual div-
isions seem to be fairly usable and practical.
7. It m.i^ht be possible to use the volitional element as a
sroupinnr principle, but it seems better to make it subordinate
that is, use it within each of the prroups m.entioned in #6.
8. Temperament can be modified by conscious direction and by
education. This bef^ins at an early ctacre in the career of
the individual--possibly in the pre-natal period.
9. There are no specific temperaments, such as the 'religious
The whole man is involved in each activity of life. Certain
temperamental forms tend toward certain kinds of religious
experience. The different relie;ious denominations may find
the explanation of their existence in this fact of psychology.
r
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